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L Introduction
"Two roads diverged in a wood, and II took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
-Robert Frost'
Lawyers seeking constitutional protection for reproductive
rights have relied almost exclusively on a liberty/privacy theory under
the Federal Constitution. In the wake of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 this theory may be seen as
providing a floor of minimum protection-preventing states from
banning abortion outright. But it is not strong enough to prevent
states from enacting restrictions on the availability of abortion. Thus,
the battle over reproductive rights may be seen as shifting from one
phase ("Can abortion be banned?") to another ("How far can states
go in restricting access to abortion?"). If proponents of reproductive
freedom are to have any success in this second phase of abortion
litigation, they must look beyond the lone theory that has so long
sustained them. They must advance new theories under the Federal
Constitution'-and they must also look to state constitutions. Except
1Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in THE OXFORD DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
295 (Angela Partington, ed., 4th ed. 1992).
2 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
3 If women are ever to become equal partners in our society, they must be granted
full control over the very thing that makes them "different"-their capacity to reproduce.
This is the essence of an equal protection argument that has yet to be advanced before
the U.S. Supreme Court. My equal protection analysis, while directed primarily at state
constitutional claims, is applicable in part to claims under the Federal Constitution. See
infra notes 238-60 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court has never
decided this issue, at least two of its members may be receptive to such an argument.
Justice Harry Blackmun, in dictum, has recognized that restrictions on abortion raise
equal protection implications. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, before her appointment to the federal bench, fought for gender equality in a
series of cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court. She filed an influential amicus
brief for the American Civil Liberties Union in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976),
the landmark decision in which the High Court first established "middle tier" or
"heightened" scrutiny for gender-based discrimination. Two justices do not comprise
a majority, of course, but their presence on the Court guarantees that such an argument
will not fall upon deaf ears.
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for a line of cases involving public funding of abortion, 4 state
constitutions have, until now, been utterly neglected.This article will explore the use of state constitutions as an
alternative or supplemental source of protection for reproductive

'Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981)
(invoking the California Constitution's express right to privacy); Doe v. Maher, 515
A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. 1986) (invoking the equal protection and liberty provisions of
the Connecticut Constitution); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (invoking the
Florida Constitution's express privacy guarantee); Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417
N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the substantive due
process guarantees of the Massachusetts Constitution); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450
A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the New Jersey
Constitution's liberty guarantee, and in the state equal protection clause); Hope v.
Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1991) (invoking both the liberty and equal
protection provisions of the New York Constitution), aftrd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App.
Div. 1993); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d
1247 (Or. 1983) (invoking the privileges and immunities clause of the Oregon
Constitution); Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 228
(W.Va. Dec. 17, 1993) (invoking the equal protection and substantive due process
guarantees of the West Virginia Constitution). A similar lawsuit was recently filed in
Florida, Doe v. State, No. CL-93-2022-AJ (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (complaint filed March 1993)
(invoking the state's express guarantees of privacy and equal protection in challenging
a scheme that denies state Medicaid coverage for medically necessary abortions but funds
childbirth expenses). But see Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114
(Pa. 1985) (rejecting state equal protection and state equal rights amendment theories).
5 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831
(Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (striking down a parental consent statute as violating the California
Constitution's express privacy guarantee); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 1992 Ohio
Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992) (striking down a mandatory 24 hour delay
and biased counseling provisions under liberty, equal protection, free speech, and
freedom of conscience provisions in the Ohio Constitution), rev'd, 627 N.E.2d 570,
dismissed, 624 N.E.2d 194, reh 'g denied, 626 N.E.2d 693; Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992) (recognizing a right of
"procreational autonomy" under the Tennessee Constitution and, based on that right,
striking down a mandatory 72 hour delay on abortions for adult women; striking down
a residency requirement under the state equal protection clause). But see Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992) (rejecting state equal protection, freedomof-religion, and establishment-of-religion claims in a challenge to abortion access
restrictions). These cases represent the first instances, outside the context of abortion
funding disputes, in which state constitutional provisions have been successfully invoked
to vindicate reproductive rights. As recently as 1991, lawyers were relying exclusively
on the Federal Constitution in challenging abortion regulations. See, e.g., Fargo
Women's Health Org. v. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993) (challenging biased
"informed consent" requirements and a mandatory 24 hour delay). In the wake of
Casey, such exclusive reliance on the Federal Constitution is no longer tenable.
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rights. I will begin by demonstrating that state courts are free to find
in their own constitutions a greater degree of protection for individual
liberty than that found by federal courts in the United States
Constitution. 6 I will then furnish a sketch of post-Casey America:
fifty separate battlegrounds in which anti-choice legislators will test
the limits of Casey's "undue burden" standard by proposing ever
more stringent obstacles to abortion. 7 Next, I will examine how a
state constitution might be employed in challenging abortion
regulations of the sort already upheld under the Federal Constitution.8
Focusing on the example of a single state-Ohio-I will show how
the unique history and text of a state constitution which may be
employed to differentiate its protections from those afforded by the
federal charter. 9 Finally, I will show that state constitutions not only
contain federal analogues (e.g., liberty, privacy, and equal protection
guarantees) of independent force,' ° but also feature provisions with
no federal counterpart (e.g., "freedom of conscience" guarantees) that
may be applicable to abortion regulations."

II. State Courts Are Free to Find in Their Own Constitutions a
Greater Degree of Protection for Individual Liberty Than That
Found by Federal Courts in the U.S. Constitution
A. Historical Perspective
In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court became the
nation's pre-eminent guardian of civil liberties by applying the Bill of
Rights to the states.' 2 But, as former Justice William Brennan
admonished, "[t]he legal revolution which has brought federal law to
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective

' See infra notes 12-75 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 76-124 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125-324 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 159-309 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 310-324 and accompanying text.
12 Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pittler, Presentinga Slate ConstitutionalArgument:
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 636 (1987).
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force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties
cannot be guaranteed. "3
After all, "the states pioneered the process of declaring
fundamental rights. "'4 America's first declarations of rights were
penned by states, 5 and the "[flramers of the various state
constitutions intended their charters as the primary devices to protect
individual rights."' 6 In fact, the Federal Bill of Rights was modeled
after provisions in state constitutions.' 7 The states "demanded and
secured the [Federal] Bill of Rights as a price for ratifying the
Constitution. "8 Moreover, at its inception, the Federal Bill of Rights
"was perceived as a secondary layer of protection, applying only
against the federal government."' 9 By contrast, state constitutions
"were conceived as the first and at one time the only line of
protection of the individual against the excess of local officials." 2"
Thus, state constitutions, construed by state courts, emerged as the
"primary defenders of civil liberties and of equal rights." 2 '
But when the Supreme Court "federalized" civil liberties
jurisprudence by selectively incorporating the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment, the states abdicated their historic role.2"
Rather than deciding claims on state constitutional grounds, state
courts merely followed U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 23 During the
1950s and 1960s, for example, "only ten state court decisions relied
on state constitutional provisions to protect individual rights."24

"3William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
14Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Abortion, Privacy, and State Constitutional Law: A
Speculation if(or When) Roe v. Wade is Overturned, 2 EMERGING ISSUES INST. CONST.
L. 173, 177 (1989) (emphasis added).
" Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 640.
I at 636.
Id.
'7 California v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975).
I8 Tepker, supra note 14, at 177.
'9 Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 636.
20 Brisendine, 531 P.2d at 1113.
2 J. Skelly Wright, in Praiseof State Courts: Confessions of a FederalJudge, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 188 (1984).
" Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 636.
Id. at 636 (stating "state constitutional rights litigation [has] all but disappeared.").
24

Id.
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This judicial hibernation waned in the 1970s, when the U.S.
Supreme Court began to interpret the Fourth Amendment ever more
narrowly. 25 These decisions gradually inspired a. rebellion among
state court judges. Balking at what they perceived to be an
unwarranted erosion of federal search and seizure protection, these
judges turned to their state constitutions. Many found a greater level
of protection than that discerned by the Supreme Court in the federal
charter.26 Soon this trend spread from the Fourth Amendment
context to other constitutional issues, including the Fifth Amendment
freedom from compelled self-incrimination," the freedom of speech, 28

See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (allowing warrantless
"inventory" searches); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (allowing the
incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment to apply to the search of the
person of a driver who was stopped on suspicion of driving with a revoked license);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding "consent" searches);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated when electronic surveillance equipment is hidden inside the clothing of an
informant who engages the defendant in conversation). This erosion continued into the
eighties. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (extending the permissible
scope of warrantless automobile searches to closed containers, including luggage carried
within the car); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that when the police
have made a lawful "custodial arrest" of the occupant of an automobile, they may,
incident to that arrest, search the car's entire passenger compartment and the contents
of any containers found therein).
' See Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (Alaska 1979) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973)); State v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting Robinson);
State v. Clyne, 541 P.2d 71, 72 (Colo. 1975) (rejecting Robinson); State v. Sarmiento,
397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth
Amendment analysis in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)); Wagner v.
Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Ky. 1979) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's
restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976)); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (N.J. 1975) (rejecting "consent" searches
like those authorized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973)); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982)); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813-14 (Wash. 1986) (rejecting the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979)).
1 See State v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme
Court's restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971)); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 662-63 (Haw. 1971) (rejecting the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris); Commonwealth v.
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and, by the end of the 1980s, the right to privacy. 29
Justice Brennan has called the resurgence of state law "the
most important development in constitutional jurisprudence in our
times. 30 Increased reliance on state constitutional provisions will
likely shape the future of civil liberties litigation, especially with
regard to privacy and reproductive freedom. But as states look once
more to their own constitutions, they will need some guidance on
how to construe state provisions vis-a-vis federal precedent.
B. Differing Approaches to State ConstitutionalInterpretation
Judges confronted with state constitutional claims must first
consider the various approaches to state constitutional jurisprudence.

Triplett, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (Pa. 1975) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive
Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris).
I See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979) (finding
California's free speech clause to confer broader protection than that guaranteed by the
Federal First Amendment); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo.
1991) (finding Colorado's free speech clause to confer broader protection than that
guaranteed by the Federal First Amendment); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626-27
(N.J. 1980) (finding New Jersey's free speech clause to confer broader protection than
that guaranteed by the Federal First Amendment).
" See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) (invoking the state's express
privacy guarantee in recognizing the right to smoke marijuana in one's home); In re
Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 771-72 (Cal. 1985) (holding sterilization
statute void on privacy and liberty grounds); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., 421
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (holding that state privacy right guarantees terminally ill person
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw.
1988) (holding that Hawaii's Constitution affords greater privacy rights than those
provided under the U.S. Constitution); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,493
(Ky. 1992) (striking down sodomy law on the grounds that it violated the Kentucky
Constitution's right to privacy and equal protection and expressly rejecting the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive privacy and equal protection analysis in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-26 (Mass. 1977) (holding that state privacy right
guarantees terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding the state privacy right guarantees a
terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); In re Welfare of
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983) (holding the state privacy right guarantees a
terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
" Brennan, supra note 13, at 497.
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Scholars have documented several different modes of analysis. These
include the "dual" approach,3" the "primacy" approach,32 and the

" Where state and federal constitutions are identical or similar, some states accord
the same construction to both. Historically, this "dual" approach emerged before the
application of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states, when states nonetheless strove to
render decisions conforming to U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Utter & Pittler, supra
note 12, at 645. The inevitable result is "'absolute deferential harmony' with Supreme
Court interpretations." Id. The dual approach has been harshly criticized as a "nonapproach" because it substitutes the judgment of the federal court for the independent
legal analysis of the state court concerning a state provision. Id. at 646. This approach
propagates a "fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart."
California v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975). State constitutions have a
legislative history wholly separate from the Federal Constitution, and usually state
provisions are more expansive as positive declarations of rights. State courts should
recall the unique features of their state constitutions when construing them. Obviously,
complete deference to U.S. Supreme Court construction denigrates the state court's role,
and highest duty, to construe independently and enforce state provisions. Utter &
Pittler, supra note 12, at 647. States employing the dual approach not only fail to
develop a constitutional jurisprudence reflecting their unique history and heritage, they
also confuse federal and state law. State courts adhering to this deferential mode of
construction risk "that the Supreme Court, by interpreting the Federal Constitution, may
later reverse or undermine the state court's ruling on its own constitution." Id. Such
a result "contradicts the historical relationship between state and federal constitutions."
Id.
32 Under the "primacy" approach, courts faced with analogous state and federal
claims consider the state claims first. Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State
Conslutions:Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. If the court finds the state
provision is dispositive of the issue, it does not even consider the federal claims. Id.
"Courts using this approach do not consider federal law and analysis as presumptively
valid, viewing them instead as no more persuasive than decisions of sister state supreme
courts." Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 647. Rather, the court adopting the primacy
approach "assumes 'that the states are the primary sovereigns and that the state
constitutions are the basic charters of individual liberties."' Id. (quoting Developments
in the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324,
1357 (1982)). As the California Supreme Court noted, "such independent construction
does not represent an unprincipled exercise of power, but a means of fulfilling our
solemn and independent constitutional obligation to interpret the safeguards guaranteed
by the [state] Constitution in a manner consistent with . . . [state] law. Committee to
Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84 (Cal. 1981). Because state
courts following the primacy approach do not feel constrained by federal law, they can
fully vindicate their role to protect fundamental freedom through an expansive
construction of state provisions. Among the advantages of using the primacy approach
are the "development of a sound body of state constitutional law, protection of state
decisions from federal review, and promotion of a healthy federalism, in which federal

12
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"supplemental" approach. 33
Under the "dual" approach, state courts treat their state
constitutions as mere reiterations of the federal charter. In construing
state provisions, they simply parrot U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
This approach prompted an exasperated dissent by a justice of the
Nebraska Supreme Court:
When called upon to construe the Nebraska
Constitution, this court should not exhibit some
Pavlovian conditioned reflex in an uncritical adoption
of federal decisions as the construction to be placed
on [the parallel provisions of our own Constitution] . 4
It is inappropriate to assume that state and federal provisions are
alike, given the unique legislative history, purpose, and text of state
constitutions. By simply following federal precedent, state courts
abdicate their duty to perform an independent interpretation of state

and state courts respect each others' authority in their respective spheres." Utter &
Pittler, supra note 12, at 647.
" The "supplemental" approach represents an accommodation between the dual and
primacy modes of analysis. Courts first look to federal precedent for guidance. "If the
Federal Constitution does not provide the requested relief, the supplemental approach
directs the state court to turn to the state constitution as a potential supplement to the
federal protections." Silverstein, supra note 32, at 217. While this approach presumes
that federal precedent is valid, "state courts do not automatically follow the federal
interpretation in construing state provisions." Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 649.
This model stems from "a perceived need to foster uniformity and avoid conflict with
federal precedent if at all possible," id. at 648, at least when the court is faced with
analogous state and federal provisions. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 932
(N.J. 1982). However, "[wihere provisions of the federal and state Constitutions differ
...or where a previously established body of state law leads to a different result, then
we must determine whether an expansive grant of rights is mandated by our state
Constitution." Id. Under this view, state constitutions serve as a "supplemental source
of protection . . .[and] provide greater protection ... than is provided by the federal
Constitution. . . ." Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental
Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 465, 475 (1985). By regarding
federal law as a floor of minimum protection, upon which states can independently
extend certain freedoms, this approach fosters a healthy respect for our federal system
and for the unique roles of federal and state courts. Utter & Pittler, supra note 11, at
638.
1 State v. Havlat. 385 N.W.2d 436, 447 (Neb. 1986) (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
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constitutions,35 and state courts abandon their historic role as
guardians of liberty by following federal decisions that increasingly
limit the scope of constitutional protection.36
By contrast, the "primacy" approach, which regards state
constitutions as the primary source of freedom, epitomizes
independent legal judgment by state courts. Under this approach,
courts faced with analogous state and federal claims consider the state
claims first. If the court finds the state provisions dispositive of the
issue, it does not even consider the federal claims. 37 The primacy
approach, however, is not well suited for most states at this early
stage of state constitutional resurgence:
[Most] states have a low level of state constitutional
rights litigation. Some state courts have virtually no
record of reliance on their state constitutions so that
large sections of the country, including the Midwest,
remain largely unaffected by the growing trend
toward development of independent state
constitutional jurisprudence.38
The "supplemental" approach, finally, offers a framework of
analysis upon which most state courts will look favorably. Rather
than dismissing entirely or adhering blindly to federal law, this

"

See State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983).

The point is not that a state's constitutional guarantees are more or
less protective in particular applications, but that they were meant to
be and remain genuine guarantees against misuse of the state's
governmental powers, truly independent of the rising and falling
tides of federal case law both in method and in specifics. State
courts cannot abdicate their responsibility for these independent
guarantees, at least not unless the people of the state themselves
choose to abandon them and entrust their rights entirely to federal
law.
Id. State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984) ("[Sitate courts have a duty to
independently interpretandapply their state constitutions that stems from the very nature
of our federal system and the vast differences between the federal and state constitutions
and courts.") (emphasis added).
I Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 647.
37 Silverstein, supra note 32, at 217.
1 Sedler, supra note 33, at 474-75.
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approach encourages state courts to draw distinctions between the
state and federal charters, and to preserve their autonomy when
construing a state provision that is different from its federal

counterpart either textually or historically.39
C. Precedents in Which State Constitutional Provisions Were
Construed to Afford Greater Protectionfor Individual Liberty
Than Their Federal Counterparts
In construing their own constitutions, state court judges are
free to find greater protection for individual liberty than that found
by federal judges in the United States Constitution.4" This is true
even where the state and federal constitutions have similar or identical
language.41
State courts in Alaska,42 Arizona,43 California,' Colorado,45
9 Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 638; Sedler, supra note 33, at 475.
o City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
4' Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. at 293; Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81.
42 Mickens v. City of Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818, 821 (Alaska 1982). The Alaska
Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, prohibits municipalities from restricting-in
places where liquor is sold-forms of expression that would otherwise enjoy First
Amendment protection. Id. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 n.6 (Alaska 1980)
(recognizing that the Alaska Constitution confers a right to privacy that is broader than
its federal counterpart); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979) (rejecting the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973)); Shagloak v. State, 597 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Alaska 1979)
(recognizing that the Alaska Constitution imposes greater restrictions than the U.S.
Constitution on the power ofjudges to impose harsher sentences on defendants convicted
after changing their pleas from guilty to not guilty); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494
(Alaska 1975) (invoking the state's express privacy guarantee in recognizing the right
to smoke marijuana in one's home); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974)
(recognizing a broader freedom from compelled self-incrimination under the Alaska
Constitution than that discerned in the Federal Fifth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme
Court); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (recognizing
a broader right to jury trials under the Alaska Constitution than that yet recognized by
the U.S. Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution).
' Fiesta Mall Venture v. Meacham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 723 (Ariz. 1988)
(recognizing that a state constitution may provide more expansive speech rights than
those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271
(Ariz. 1984) (recognizing broader protection from double jeopardy under the Arizona
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Connecticut," Delaware,4 7 Florida,4" Georgia, 49 Hawaii,50 Illinois,5"

Constitution than that found by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Federal Constitution).
"Academy of Pediatrics v. Van Do Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 49 (1989) (Cal. C.A.
Oct. 12, 1992) (recognizing that the express privacy guarantee contained in the
California Constitution is broader than the federal right to privacy and striking down a
parental-consent-for-abortion statute as violating the California Constitution's express
privacy guarantee); In re Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985)
(finding sterilization statute void on privacy and liberty grounds); State v. Ruggles, 702
P.2d 170 (Cal. 1985) (search and seizure) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive
Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)); Committee
to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (1981); Robins v. Pruncyard
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979) (finding California's free speech clause
to confer broader protection than that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); State v.
Maher, 550 P.2d 1044 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive
Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); State
v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's
restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
4S Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991) (finding that
Colorado's free speech clause confers broader protection than the U.S. Constitution);
Conrad v. City of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 674 (Colo. 1983) (holding that a government
display of nativity scene violated the state constitution); State v. Clyne, 541 P.2d 71, 72
(Colo. 1975) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis
in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
"Daly v. DelPonte, 608 A.2d 93, 98 (Conn. 1992) (recognizing that Connecticut's
equal protection clause is broader than its federal counterpart); State v. Morrill, 534
A.2d 1165, 1169 (Conn. 1987) (recognizing that the state constitution affords greater
substantive protection than does the Fourth Amendment in setting the standard for
determining probable cause to search); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. 1986)
(concluding that a state regulation modeled after a federal medicaid program which
restricts abortion funding violates the state constitution); Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc.,
469 A.2d 1201, 1206 (Conn. 1984) (recognizing that a state may provide speech rights
more expansive than those guaranteed by the Federal Constitution).
' Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980) (holding the
state constitution affords a right to privacy which guarantees the guardian of a terminally
ill person the right to assert the ill person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
I In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing that Florida's
Constitution extends the privacy right further than the Federal Constitution by allowing
abortion for minors); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 647 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the
U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1970)).
49 Pel Assoc. v. Joseph, 427 S.E.2d 264, 265 (Ga. 1993) (striking down, under
Georgia's free speech clause, nude-dancing restrictions of the sort upheld under the First
Amendment in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)); Gary v. State, 422
S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 1992) (holding that the Georgia Constitution imposes more
exacting search and seizure standards than the Federal Fourth Amendment, and refusing

16

NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI

Kentucky,2 Louisiana, 3 Maryland," Massachusetts," Michigan,56

to recognize a "good faith exception" like that prevailing in federal search and seizure
jurisprudence).
-oBaehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) (recognizing, in dictum, that the
state's equal protection clause may confer a right to same-sex marriage); State v. Kam,
748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988) (holding that Hawaii's Constitution affords greater
privacy rights than those provided under the Federal Constitution); State v. Kaluna, 520
P.2d 51, 58-59 (Haw. 1974) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth
Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); State v.
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Haw. 1971) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's
restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis regarding self-incrimination in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
1992) (recognizing heightened
51State v. McCauley, 595 N.E.2d 583, 585-86 (I11.
protections against compelled self-incrimination under the state constitution).
52 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 847 S.W.2d 487, 491-501 (Ky. 1992) (expressly
rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive privacy analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), by striking down the state's sodomy law on the grounds that it
violated the state constitution's right to privacy and equal protection); Wagner v.
Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352, 355-56 (Ky. 1979) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis regarding search and seizure in South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)).
53Banks v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 598 So.2d 515, 517 n.3 (La.
Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that the right to privacy set forth in the Louisiana
Constitution affords greater protection than its federal counterpart); State v.
Vanderlinder, 575 So. 2d 521, 523 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing that the right to
privacy set forth in the Louisiana Constitution affords greater protection than its federal
counterpart); State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 996-97 (La. 1989) (striking down a
sobriety check roadblock which "may meet Fourth Amendment standards," but violated
the "higher standard of individual liberty" afforded under the Louisiana Constitution).
s'Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (invoking the State Equal
Rights Amendment to prohibit the state in a criminal prosecution from using peremptory
challenges so as to exclude a person from service as a juror because of that person's
sex).
11Commonwealth v. Ford, 476 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Mass. 1985) (holding that a more
restrictive exclusionary rule exists under Massachusetts state law); Batchelder v. Allied
Stores Int'l, 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Mass. 1983) (finding the Massachusetts free speech
clause to confer broader protection than its federal counterpart); Moe v. Secretary of
Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Mass. 1981) (holding that a state provision restricting
medicaid funding of abortions violated the state due process guarantee); Superintendent
of Belchertown State Schools v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977) (finding
that a state privacy right guarantees a terminally ill person the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment).
soSitz v. Department of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the Michigan Constitution affords greater protection from unreasonable
search and seizure than the Fourth Amendment, and invalidating sobriety checkpoints
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Minnesota,57 Montana,58 New Hampshire,59 New Jersey," New
York,6" North Carolina, 62 Ohio, 63 Oregon," Pennsylvania, 65 Rhode

which were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment), aff'd 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich.
1993); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Mich. 1985)
(recognizing that a state may provide speech rights more expansive than those guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution); State v. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Mich. 1975)
(rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis of search
and seizure in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)); cf Hobbins v. Attorney
General, No. 93-306-178-CZ, slip op. at 17 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 20, 1993)
(recognizing, in dictum, the "right to choose to cease living" under both the U.S. and
Michigan Constitutions and striking down, on other grounds, a ban on assisted suicide).
5' O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978)).
' State v. Sierra, 692 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Mont. 1985) (recognizing that the Montana
Constitution affords greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Mont. 1977) (rejecting
the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)).
" State v. Laurie, 606 A.2d 1077, 1080 (N.H. 1992) (recognizing that the New
Hampshire Constitution confers more stringent protections against compelled selfincrimination than the Federal Fifth Amendment); State v. Camargo, 498 A.2d 292
(N.H. 1985) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
o Greenbergv. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294 (N.J. 1985) (establishing an independent
and stricter standard for equal protection analysis); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d
925 (N.J. 1982) (abortion funding); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (finding
New Jersey's free speech clause to confer broader protection than that guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (state privacy right
guarantees terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); State v.
Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (rejecting "consent" searches like those authorized by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
61 Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991), af'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Div. 1993), appeal dismissed, 82 N.Y.2d 680, appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 68
(1993) (striking down a provision which fails to allow funded abortions for women with
incomes below the federal poverty line but funds prenatal care); State v. Scott, 593
N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that the New York Constitution contains greater
protection against improper searches and seizures by the police than is currently afforded
by U.S. Supreme Court precedent).
I State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N.C. 1981) (recognizing that a state may
provide speech rights more expansive than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution);
State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555-56 (N.C. 1988) (recognizing that the North
Carolina Constitution confers greater protection against unreasonable search and seizure
than the Federal Fourth Amendment).
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Island,6 Tennessee,67 Texas,68 Utah, 69 Vermont, 70 Washington,7" and

's State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981)); Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992)
(striking down an abortion statute that contained a mandatory 24-hour delay and biased
counseling provisions of the sort upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Casey, by
invoking liberty, equal protection, free speech, and freedom of conscience provisions in
the Ohio Constitution).
64State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1988) (refusing to adopt a broad "open
fields" exception to warrantless searches and seizures and rejecting the U.S. Supreme
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984)); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist., 715 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986) (religious
invocation in high school commencement exercise violates the Oregon Constitution's
religion clause); State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985) (free speech rights); State v.
Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323-26 (Or. 1983) (recognizing broader protection from
double jeopardy under the Oregon Constitution than that found by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the Federal Constitution); State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802 (Or. 1983) (state
constitutional basis for search and seizure exclusionary rule).
65 Commonwealth v. Danforth, 576 A.2d 1013, 1022 (Pa. 1990) (recognizing greater
restrictions on blood, breath, and urine tests under the Pennsylvania Constitution than
those found by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Federal Fourth Amendment);
Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989) (holding that the warrant
requirement in the Pennsylvania Constitution is "more exacting" than its counterpart in
the U.S. Constitution); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut
General Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Pa. 1986) (recognizing that a state may
provide speech rights more expansive than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution);
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's
restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
6Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1350 (R.I. 1989) (recognizing
that state supreme courts have the right and power to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures under state constitutions and that the Federal Constitution only
establishes a minimum level of protection).
67 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-603 (Tenn. 1992) (recognizing a right of
"procreational autonomy" in the Tennessee Constitution's implicit privacy guarantee, and
applying it in the context of a divorcing couple's fight over possession of frozen
embryos); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 19, 1992) (construing the right of procreational autonomy under the Tennessee
Constitution and, based on that right, striking down a mandatory 72-hour delay on
abortions for adult women as well as a residency requirement under the state equal
protection clause).
68 Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (rejecting the
U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis for inventory searches in
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (relying on a state constitutional provision that
requires the legislature to establish and support free public schools and invalidating a
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West Virginia72 have recognized and acted upon this principle.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, referring to the state and
federal constitutions, observed that citizens enjoy a "double-barrelled
source of protection which safeguards their privacy from
unauthorized and unwarranted intrusions" by the government. 7 It
stressed that state courts, when interpreting their own constitutions,
have the right and the power to implement standards of individual
liberty which are higher than those required by ,the Federal
Constitution.7 4

In a similar context, the Supreme Court of Hawaii observed:

public education finance system which had survived Federal Equal Protection challenges
in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 441 U.S. 1 (1973)).
' State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,,272 n.1 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring)
(rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
o Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84 (Vt. Super. Ct. 1986) (abortion funding) (slip opinion
unavailable; cited in Janice Steinschneider, Note, State Constitutions: The New Battlefield
for Abortion Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 284, 287 (1987)).
71State v. Griffith, 808 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Wash. 1991) (recognizing that the
Washington Constitution confers greater protection for privacy interests than the Federal
Fourth Amendment); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm.,
780 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Wash. 1989) (recognizing that a state may provide speech rights
more expansive than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); State v. Gunwall, 720
P.2d 808, 814 (Wash. 1986) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth
Amendment analysis in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)); In re Colyer, 660
P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (state privacy right guarantees terminally ill person the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment).
72 Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 228 (W. Va. Dec.
17, 1993) (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion under equal
protection and substantive due process theories advanced under the West Virginia
Constitution); State v. Bonham, 317 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1984) (recognizing that
the West Virginia Constitution imposes greater restrictions on the power of judges to
issue harsher sentences to those whose convictions are sustained after exercising their
statutory right to a trial de novo in the court of appeals and expressly rejecting the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive due process analysis in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104
(1972)); Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760, 764-65 (W. Va. 1980) (applying strict
scrutiny in gender-discrimination cases based on state remedies guarantee).
7 Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1350 (R.I. 1989) (citation
omitted).
' Id. at 1350; see supra note 66.
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[Wihile this results in a divergence of meaning
between words which are the same in both state and
federal constitutions, the system of federalism
envisaged by the United States Constitution tolerates
such divergence where the result is greaterprotection
of individualrights under state law than underfederal
75
law.

The future of reproductive freedom in this country may
depend largely on the willingness of state court judges to find a
heightened level of protection for individual liberty in their state
constitutions.
III. Post-Casey America: Fifty New Battlegrounds
A. Casey's "Undue Burden" Standard
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the substantive liberty
guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment, while barring states from
banning abortion outright,77 nevertheless leaves them ample latitude
in restricting access to abortion.7"
In so holding, the Court
established a new standard-the "undue burden" test-for gauging the
constitutionality of abortion regulations. 79 Under this standard, strict
scrutiny will be applied only to those regulations that impose a
"substantial obstacle" in the paths of women seeking abortions."0
In applying this standard, the Court showed that only the most
onerous restrictions will be deemed to represent an "undue burden."
Faced with a variety of provisions, the Court struck down only a
husband-notification requirement." It upheld a mandatory 24-hour
Casey,76

I State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 1974) (emphasis added).
76 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
"

Id. at 2804.

7 Id. at 2820-21.
79

Id.

'0 Id. at 2821.
11Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2829-30.
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delay, 82 as well as a requirement that prospective patients
receive-under the guise of "informed consent"-a state-printed
brochure designed to dissuade them from having an abortion.83
One would imagine that from a woman's perspective these
provisions do impose "substantial" obstacles in the path to an
abortion. The 24-hour delay, by effectively requiring two separate
trips to the clinic,4 imposes special hardships on poor and rural
women, many of whom must travel great distances to reach the clinic

82Id. at 2825-26.
83 See id. at 2824 ("[wle permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the
life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and
informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion.").
"Mandatory delays are invariably accompanied by "informed consent" counseling
requirements. For example, in Pennsylvania and Ohio, a woman must receive certain
state-printed materials and, in addition, complete a face-to-face informational meeting
with a physician, at least 24 hours before the procedure is performed. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.56(B) (Anderson 1992); Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982,
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220. Under these provisions, it is impossible to
combine-in one visit-both the informed consent counseling and the abortion procedure
itself. Most, if not all, women will have to visit the abortion clinic twice: first, for the
informational visit, and second, for the abortion itself. Other physicians, including
family practitioners or physicians outside the OB/GYN specialty, will not be able to
satisfy the informational requirements imposed by the statute. The Ohio requirements
mandate that the physician describe: (1) the particular abortion procedure to be used;
(2) the medical risks associated with that procedure; (3) the medical risks associated with
abortion generally; (4) the probable gestational age of the fetus; and (5) the medical risks
associated with carrying the pregnancy to term. See, e.g., id. at § 2317.56 (B)(1)
(Anderson 1992). Family practitioners and physicians outside the OB/GYN specialty
will not be able to satisfy these informational requirements. Thus, the woman will be
left with little choice but to visit the abortion clinic for the requisite "counseling." This
is true for two additional reasons. First, many women who obtain abortions in one state
actually reside in another state, see Lisa Belkin, Woman Behind the Symbols in Abortion
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1989, § 1, at 18; they cannot rely on local physicians to
satisfy the requirements of a foreign statute. Second, referring physicians cannot be
counted on to provide the state-printed brochure typically required under these statutes.
Such brochures must be purchased from the government of the state where the abortion
is performed. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE § 2317.56 (D). Physicians who do not
actually perform abortions have no reason to incur the expense of purchasing these
brochures. Thus, mandatory 24-hour delays effectively require most, if not all, women
to make two separate trips to the clinic-once for the informational visit, and a second
time for the abortion procedure itself.
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and cannot afford the cost of an overnight stay." The "informed
consent" materials confront the woman with pictures of the fetus "at
two-week gestational increments" so that she can see its "probable
anatomical and physiological characteristics" deep into the third

trimester.16 These materials are transparently designed to traumatize
the woman and to convey a message that the government (indeed,
that her doctor)7 disapproves of her choice. 88

" A requirement prompting multiple trips to the clinic will necessarily compound the
burdens and costs already borne by women seeking abortions. Take, for example, the
facts prevailing in Ohio. In a recent challenge to Casey-type restrictions there, the
unrefuted testimony established that 77 of Ohio's 88 counties have no abortion provider;
that one third of Ohio patients travel over 50 miles one way to reach a clinic; that the
need for traveling long distances causes women to delay or forego obtaining an abortion;
that the burdens of travel fall heaviest upon the poorest, youngest, and least sophisticated
women; that lengthy travel results in child care expenses, time lost from work, and
physical and emotional strain; that all of the foregoing problems are compounded by the
burdens and delays associated with multiple trips to the clinic; that multiple trips will
cause women to obtain abortions later in their pregnancies; that the later an abortion is
performed, the greater the risk of complications and death; and that, faced with the
prospect of multiple trips, some women will be forced to incur lodging costs for an
overnight stay-thereby losing confidentiality because of the need for explaining their
overnight absence to family, friends, and employers. Affidavit of Stanley K. Henshaw,
Ph.D., Voinovich, 1992 Ohio LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 18, 1992). Thus, mandatory
delays have the necessary effect of subjecting women to substantially greater costs,
burdens, and medical risks.
86 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2836.
"7Typically, the state-printed brochure must be delivered to the woman by her
doctor. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE § 2317.56 (B)(3)(b). The fact that her doctor is
delivering this "information" may suggest to the woman that the doctor disapproves of
her decision to abort. Affidavit of John Fletcher, Ph.D., Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc.
LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 18, 1992).
" "Informed consent" provisions of the type enacted in Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 3205 (1992), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Baldwin 1994),
Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-33 (1993), and North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code
§ 14-02.1-02, typically require that each woman seeking an abortion receive state-printed
materials containing pictures or descriptions of the fetus "at two-week gestational
increments" so that she can see its "probable anatomical and physiological
characteristics"; information about the possibility of fetal survival; a list of agencies and
services that are available to assist the woman through pregnancy and childbirth; an
explanation of the availability of medical assistance benefits for prenatal care, childbirth,
and neonatal care; and information about the father's obligation to provide child support
payments. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.56 (B), (C). In addition to receiving these
state-printed materials, the woman must also complete a face-to-face counseling session
with a physician-and all of this must occur more than 24 hours before the abortion can
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The significance of the undue burden test may be seen in one,
simple fact: It was used in Casey to uphold precisely the type of
restrictions that the Court struck down in 19838' and 1986.90 At that
time, the Court had little.patience for schemesby the government to
disseminate anti-abortion sentiments "[uinder the guise of informed
consent." 9 In refreshingly frank language, the Court observed:
The printed materials . . . seem to us to be nothing
less than an outright attempt to wedge the [state's]
message discouragingabortion into the privacy of the
informed-consent dialogue between the woman and
her physician. The mandated description of fetal
characteristics at two-week intervals, no matter how
objective, is plainly overinclusive.
This is not
medical information that is always relevant to the
woman's decision, and it may serve only to confuse
and punish her and to heighten her anxiety, contrary
to accepted medical practice.92
In Casey, this frankness is replaced by a sudden inability to discern
the heavy-handed preaching that the Court previously found so

be performed. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.56 (B). No matter how objectively
it is conveyed, the state-mandated "information" will necessarily communicate an antiabortion message from the government. In particular, the pictures of fetal development
and the information about fetal survival are designed to inspire, and will certainly create,
feelings of guilt, shame, and anxiety in the woman, thereby dissuading her from having
an abortion. Affidavit of Jay Katz, M.D., Voinovich, 1992 Ohio LEXIS I (Ohio C.P.
May 18, 1992). Thus, these provisions exploit the informed consent dialogue, using it
as an opportunity for disseminating an anti-abortion message-a government-sponsored,
doctor-delivered message-that interferes with a woman's reproductive decisionmaking.
s City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking
down a mandatory 24-hour delay).
90 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (striking down biased counseling provisions, including a requirement that
each woman seeking an abortion receive a state-printed brochure containing pictures or
descriptions of fetal development).
9'Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
Id. at 762-63 (emphasis added).
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objectionable."
Thus, by means of the undue burden test, Casey substantially
lowered the floor of minimum protection for reproductive autonomy,
which the federal right to privacy had long sustained. The precise
level of this "floor" is undetermined-and efforts are already
underway in state legislatures to lower it as far as the undue burden
test will permit.' 4 Our question is whether the heightened protections
formerly conferred by the Federal Constitution can be restored by
means of state constitutional provisions.
B. Testing the Limits of the "Undue Burden" Standard:
HarsherRestrictions Loom on the Horizon
Inevitably, Casey will be viewed by some state legislators as
an invitation to enact comparable, if not harsher, restrictions on
access to abortion.95 Indeed, many states have recently imposed
mandatory delays and biased counseling requirements of the sort
upheld in Casey.96 Some states even require delays of forty-eight

93 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.

It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of
health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers
the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect
an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.
Id.
9 See infra part III.B.
9 See Estelle H. Rogers, Change of Venue: Abortion Regulation in the States, 3 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 123 (1994) (charting recent legislative developments).
" These states include Alabama, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Tennessee. The Status of Women's Reproductive Freedom, REPROD.
FREEDOM IN THE STATES. (Center for Reprod. Law & Policy, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1992
at 3-9 [hereinafter IN THE STATES]. Comparable legislation is in conference committee,
but has yet to be enacted, in Michigan. Id. at 7. In 1992, Casey-type provisions were
narrowly defeated in the Nebraska and South Carolina legislatures. Id. at 8, 10.
However, this year such restrictions were adopted by Nebraska lawmakers. In the
States: Legislative Action, REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS (Ctr. for Reprod. L. & Pol'y, New
York, N.Y.), June 18, 1993 at 7.
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hours' and seventy-two hours9" for all women seeking abortions.
Certain states have enacted virtual bans on abortion. 99 Likewise,
abortion bans have been proposed in ballot initiatives in several
states. to
Though the most extreme of these measures have been

' Maine enacted a 48 hour mandatory waiting period for all women seeking
abortions, which was subsequently struck down by a federal district court. Women's
Community Health Ctr., Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 550 (Me. 1979).
" The Tennessee legislature enacted a 72 hour delay in 1992. IN THE STATES, supra
note 96, at 10-11. That provision was struck down by a state trial court judge in
Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672, slip op. at 19-20 (Tenn.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992). In 1992 the Colorado legislature rejected efforts to enact a 72
hour waiting period. IN THE STATES, supra note 96, at 4.
'9 Sweeping restrictions on abortion have been enacted in Louisiana, Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (1993), and Guam. In these jurisdictions, abortions are banned
except to save a woman's life; Louisiana and Utah also permit an exception in cases of
rape or incest. INTHE STATES, supra note 96, at 6, 11, 12. On September 22, 1992, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Louisiana statute. Sojourner
v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992). Proponents of the Louisiana measure are
currently seeking review of that decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. IN THE STATES,
supra note 96, at 6. The court found Utah's statute less restrictive than Pennsylvania's,
held against the plaintiffs who challenged it and awarded costs and fees to defendants.
See Utah Women's Health Clinic v. Leavitt, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2279 at *8, *39 (D.
Utah Feb. 1, 1994). On November 30, 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review
a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit striking down Guam's
statute. IN THE STATES, supra note 96, at 12. In South Dakota, a bill banning abortion
was defeated by only one vote in the state senate in 1991. Id. at 10.
'0' In Arizona, the electorate rejected a ballot referendum in 1992 that would have
banned abortion. IN THE STATES, supra note 96, at 3. In Colorado, the state supreme
court recently thwarted efforts by anti-choice groups to place an abortion ban on the
ballot. Id. at 4. Likewise, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in August 1992 ruled that a
statewide initiative banning abortion could not appear on the November ballot because,
if passed, it would violate Casey. In re Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992).
Anti-choice supporters of this initiative are seeking U.S. Supreme Court review. IN THE
STATES, supra note 96, at 9. In 1990, Oregon voters defeated a statewide ballot
referendum proposing a ban on abortion. id. at 10. In Wyoming, anti-choice activists
did not obtain the requisite signatures needed to place an abortion ban on the ballot in
1992, but have collected the quantity of names needed to submit the measure for
approval in the 1994 election. Id. at 12. In October 1993, the Wyoming measure
survived a pre-election challenge filed in state court. REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS (Ctr. for
Reprod. L. & Pol'y, New York, N.Y.) Oct. 22, 1993 at 12.
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defeated,' the great volume of this legislative activity shows that
even more agitation may be expected in Casey's wake."0 2 This is true
not only because of the abiding preoccupation with abortion in so
many state capitols, but also because the very novelty of the undue
burden standard will prompt efforts to test its limits.
Two separate questions will arise in this new round of
legislation and litigation. First, will application of the undue burden
standard vary from state to state? Second, what are the outer limits
of permissible regulation under the new standard?
The first question may be phrased more precisely as follows:
Once the Supreme Court determines that a particular regulation is not
an undue burden, does this finding apply in all fifty states? What
about variations in local circumstances? In gauging the impact of a
twenty-four hour waiting period, for example, shouldn't we consider
the number of abortion clinics within the particular state, their
geographic distribution, and the number of miles a woman must
travel to reach a clinic? Even if upheld in Pennsylvania, where
clinics are scattered throughout the state, might not such a provision
create an undue burden in North Dakota, which has only one clinic?
This question has yet to be resolved. The Supreme Court
seemed to indicate that local circumstances do not matter when it
denied certiorari in a Mississippi suit where Casey-type provisions,
including a twenty-four hour delay, were upheld. 0 3 Obviously,
denials of certiorari are not reliable indicators of where the Court is
headed, but the Mississippi case would have been a perfect vehicle
for addressing this question. The challenged provisions were
'0' See supra notes 96-100. But see Barnes v. State, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 468 (1993) (upholding a Mississippi statute requiring minors to
obtain written permission from both parents before having an abortion, finding this
requirement not to be an "undue burden").
" See, e.g., Utah H.R. 129, 50th Legis., Gen. Sess. (1994).
'03 Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 656
91992) (upholding Mississippi's informed consent statute as "substantially identical" to
the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey). More recently, Justice Souter rejected
efforts in the Casey litigation to revive the plaintiffs' facial challenge by means of a new
trial-in which additional evidence would be adduced in an attempt to satisfy the new
"undue burden" standard. 114 S. Ct. 909 (in chambers opinion, Souter, Circuit Justice
1993). The Third Circuit denied plaintiffs a new trial, and Justice Souter, acting in his
capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, refused to stay enforcement of those
provisions in the Pennsylvania statute that were upheld in its 1992 decision. Id.
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virtually identical to those at issue in Casey, while the local
circumstances in Mississippi are very different from Pennsylvania.
In Pennsylvania, for example, nearly sixty percent of the women
seeking abortions in 1988 lived within an hour's drive to a clinic. °4
In Mississippi, on the other hand, seventy-nine of the eighty-two
counties have no abortion provider..10 Nearly half of all women
obtaining abortions there must travel over 100 miles one way. °6
Thus, mandatory delays pose a greater burden on women in
Mississippi than on women in Pennsylvania. Might not such a
07
burden be "undue?"'1
The second question involves the outer limits of permissible
regulation under the new standard. Biased counseling provisions and
mandatory delays of twenty-four hours are now approved. On the
other end of the spectrum, outright bans on abortion are
impermissible. What remains is a vast expanse of middle ground or
uncharted territory. The only guidepost that currently exists is the
8 This leaves
husband-notification provision invalidated in Casey.0'
state legislators wide latitude to test the limits of the undue burden
standard, concocting ever more stringent restrictions in what will
become a new generation of abortion cases.
The most likely scenario is that states will enact, in a ratchetlike manner, a series of increasingly restrictive provisions, using as
their starting point the various statutes already upheld by the Supreme
Court. Thus, if a twenty-four hour delay is permissible," why not
impose a seventy-two hour wait? The Tennessee legislature has
already enacted such a measure." 0 If viability testing may be

'04 Casey,

744 F. Supp. 1323, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1990).

'o5
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Hear Mississippi Abortion Case,
N.Y.Tms, Dec.8, 1992, at A22.
SId. at 79.
107 It seems likely that these questions will be resolved in the context of as-applied,
rather than facial challenges. Justice Souter indicated as much in refusing to stay
enforcement of the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey, 114 S.Ct. 909 (in chambers
opinion, Souter, Circuit Justice 1993).
'0 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2830-31.
0' id. at 2825-26.
"oTENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-202(b)(6)(d)(1) (1993). That provision was struck
down by a state trial court judge in Planned Parenthood Assoc., Inc. v. McWherter, slip
op. at 19-20, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992) (recognizing a right of
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required at twenty weeks gestation," tt why not fifteen weeks? If the
state is free to exploit "informed consent" counseling as a vehicle for
disseminating an anti-abortion message,' why not require every
patient to view a state-produced videotape containing pictures of
aborted fetuses?
Within ten years, the outer boundaries of the undue burden
standard will have come into focus. In the meantime, defenders of
reproductive freedom should consider alternatives to the
liberty/privacy theory that has so long sustained them.

C. Fighting Back: The Search for New Legal Theories
Except for a line of cases vindicating the right of indigent
women to public funding of abortion," 3 state constitutions have been
utterly neglected, until quite recently, by lawyers working to advance
the cause of reproductive freedom. Within the past year, however,
lawyers in Tennessee,11 4 California,"' and Ohio 1 6 have successfully
invoked their state constitutions in challenging restrictions on
abortion. These recent victories demonstrate that state court judges,
in construing their state constitutions, may be willing to recognize a
higher degree of protection for reproductive autonomy than that
afforded by the Federal Constitution.
In Tennessee, the court recognized a right of "procreational
autonomy" under the state constitution in striking down a seventy-two

"procreational autonomy" under the Tennessee Constitution).
"I Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
112See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24.
'"See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
"4 Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 19, 1992).
'" American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, No. A040911 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 12, 1992).
"16Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992), reversed, 627
N.E.2d 570, dismissed, 624 N.E.2d 194, reh'g denied 626 N.E.2d 693 (the trial court
struck down a mandatory 24 hour delay and biased counseling provisions under liberty,
equal protection, free speech, and freedom of conscience provisions in the Ohio
Constitution, but was subsequently reversed).
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hour waiting period. 17 In Ohio, the court invalidated a twenty-four
hour delay and biased counseling requirements under state
constitutional guarantees of liberty, tt ' equal protection," t9 freedom of
2 The court also relied upon
speech, 2 ' and "freedom of conscience. "'
the Federal Equal Protection Clause. In California, the court relied
on that state's express right to privacy in striking down a parental
23
consent statute.1
These cases show that viable new theories are available, and
that they fall into three groups:
(1)
(2)

(3)

state constitutional provisions with direct
counterparts in the Federal Constitution (e.g.,
liberty and equal protection);
state constitutional provisions with no federal
counterpart (e.g., express privacy and
"freedom of conscience" guarantees); and
provisions in the Federal Constitution not yet
presented to the Supreme Court as a basis for
abortion rights (e.g., equal protection).

This article will now demonstrate how all of these theories might be
employed in vindicating the reproductive autonomy of women. 24

".. Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672, slip op. at 19-20
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992).
" Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992).

"9

Id. at 13-15.
at 11-13.
at 10-11.

20Id.
121Id.

Id. at 15, 28.
3 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 263 Ca. Rptr. 46, 49 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
14 My equal protection analysis, though directed primarily at state constitutional
claims, is applicable in part to claims under the Federal Constitution. See infra notes
238-60 and accompanying text.
12
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IV. How a State Constitution Might Be Employed in Challenging
Abortion Regulations of the Sort Already Upheld Under the
Federal Constitution
A. The Example of Ohio
In explaining how a state constitution might be employed in
challenging restrictions on abortion, we will focus on the example of
a single state-Ohio., Many states have shown a special reluctance to
interpret their constitutions independently.12 Ohio courts have long
treated their state constitution as a mere reiteration of the federal
charter.' 26 Moreover, Ohio has often been the scene of fierce
abortion battles.127 Thus, Ohio provides a good illustration of the
challenges to be faced by lawyers who employ state constitutions in
the cause of reproductive freedom.
B. The Unique Text and History of Ohio's Constitution
When invoking a state constitution, the first task is to
emphasize its unique text and history. 128 This is necessary in order
to overcome the pervasive judicial tendency to view state constitutions
as empty reiterations of the federal charter.
In fact, state constitutions depart dramatically from the federal
text. This is particularly true of their protections for fundamental
rights. The federal Bill of Rights is phrased negatively, as a restraint
on governmental power. The First Amendment, for example, begins:
"Congress shall make no law . .. "129 and each succeeding provision
in the Bill of Rights is framed as a "Thou Shalt Not." Most state
constitutions, on the other hand, express these guarantees in

125 Sedler,
1'2 See

supra note 33, at 474-75.

infra notes 139-58 and accompanying text.

"2See, e.g., Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. Ohio, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(Akron I) (requiring 24-hour delay on abortions); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 479 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron II) (requiring parental consent).
12

See State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) (outlining an approach to briefing

state constitutional theories).
129U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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affirmative, rather than negative, language. Compare, for example,
the free speech clause of the Ohio Constitution-"Every citizen may
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press"'O-to its
counterpart in the Federal Constitution-" Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "31 These
textual differences are so striking that a court, when presented with
the contrast, should hesitate before pronouncing that both be given
the identical construction.12 if a court were interpreting contractual
terms, would it conclude, as readily as some courts have, 3 ' that these
clauses are coextensive?
Thus, textual differences between the state and federal
charters may be employed in urging a more expansive interpretation
of the state provision. But even if the state provision is identical to
its federal counterpart the unique history of the state constitution-the
factual circumstances prompting its creation, the legislative
deliberations surrounding its composition, and the ratification debates
that led to its adoption-may justify a broader construction.
Accordingly, lawyers planning to utilize a state constitution
must perform historical research into its origins. Just as James
130 OHIO CONST. art. I,
131 U.S.
132 See

§ 11.

CONST. amend. I.

infra Part IV. D. 3. a. As is apparent, Ohio's free speech provision contains
two distinct clauses, one that is phrased in "positive" language, and one that is phrased
in "negative" language. State free speech provisions may be grouped into three
categories: those that emulate the exclusively "negative" language of the Federal First
Amendment, see, e.g., HAW. CoNsT. art. I, § 4; those that confer speech rights in
sweeping "affirmative" language, see, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; and those, that
combine affirmative and negative clauses; see, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. I, § 21.
133See State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 1991); Woodland v.'Michigan
Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 344 (Mich. 1985); SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven
Hall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (N.Y. 1985); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982
Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1334 (Pa. 1986); Jacobs
v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 841 (Wvis. 1987). A number of states have recognized,
however, that the "positive" language in the free speech clauses of their state
constitutions confers broader protection than the Federal First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979); Block v.
Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615
(N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Ferner v. Toledo-Lucas County
Convention & Vistors' Bureau, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
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Madison and Thomas Jefferson are cited by litigants advancing a
particular interpretation of the Federal Constitution, "founding
fathers" of the state constitution should likewise be identified and
invoked. In most states, unfortunately, the historical record will
hardly be accessible. The sources are few and far between, and they
are not likely to include an equivalent to The FederalistPapers.
Nevertheless, the search is well worth pursuing. In Ohio, for
example, one finds intriguing evidence that the state's early politics
were dominated by settlers from Virginia who brought with them a
Jeffersonian passion for individual liberty.134
Equally intriguing is the libertarian spirit that animated the
drafters of Ohio's first Constitution.135 That charter, drafted in 1802,

" Soon after the Northwest Ordinance was passed July 13, 1787, the State of
Virginia acquired some four million acres of land north of the Ohio River. This tract
became known as the Virginia Military District because the Gov. of Virginia awarded
plots of land to soldiers for their valiant service in the Revolution. See R.C. Downes,
Frontier Ohio: 1788 to 1803, 3 OHIO HIST. COLLECTIONS 81 (1935). As a result,
Virginians dominated the early settlement of Ohio and exerted great influence over the
political climate of the Territory. Pioneers from Virginia founded such Ohio cities as
Manchester (1791) and Chillicothe (1796), which became the political center of the
Territory. "Around Chillicothe as a center of Virginian settlers gathered some of the
noted men of Ohio's early history, such men as Tiffin the first governor; McArthur, a
later governor; Worthington a United States Senator from Ohio, and Baldwin speaker
of the lower houseof the legislature." R.E. CHADDOCK, OHIO BEFORE 1850: A STUDY OF
THE EARLY lh FLuEmECE OF PENNSYLvANIA AND Sou-ERN PoPtuAT1oNs INOHIo 236 (1908). "lhe
earliest laws of the Territory were copied from existing laws in Virginia, Pennsylvania,
and Kentucky. Id. at 237.
By 1799, the Territory had grown sufficiently populous to create the first
territorial legislature as prescribed by the Northwest Ordinance. Virginian settlers who
followed the ideals of Thomas Jefferson dominated the legislature. Id. at 241-42.
Increasingly dissatisfied with the territorial regime and especially with the unbridled
power of Governor Arthur St. Clair, who enjoyed an absolute veto over legislative acts,
these men led Ohio's quest for statehood. "Jefferson was the guiding spirit of these
men, the friend of the West. The spirit of individual liberty and opposition to a paternal
control was in the air among the people moving into the Northwest Territory." Id. at
235. The legislature galvanized an intense political movement that succeeded in passing
the enabling act to form the State of Ohio on Apr. 30, 1802. Id.
'" The delegates to the first constitutional convention of Ohio met in Chillicothe on
Nov. 1, 1802. "It was their purpose to remedy the supposed evils of the former system
and to introduce a thoroughly democratic form of government in harmony with the ideas
and needs of the people." CHADDOCK, supranote 134, at 62. Once again, the Virginians
assumed leadership at this critical juncture in Ohio's history. Edward Tiffin, a
Virginian, was selected to preside over the convention. Id. at 63. Of 20 delegates
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provided a more inclusive enumeration of rights and imposed more
restraints on governmental power over individual liberty than did the
Federal Bill of Rights.136 Moreover, during the second constitutional
convention of 1851, the delegates not only preserved the declaration
of rights but moved it to a position of prominence, at the very front
of the new Constitution. 37 It has remained there, undiluted, ever

whose backgrounds were traced, nine were from Virginia. Id. at 62. These Virginians
exerted considerable influence over the convention by chairing major committees. A
study of the committees shows clearly the control that Jefferson's followers exerted over
both the proceedings and the convention's result. Id. at 63. During the debates of
Ohio's first convention, "[a] central theme ... was the placing of all the agencies of the
State subject to the will of the people who had been so long deprived of a real share in
political life." R.C. Downes, Ohio's First Convention, 25 NORTHWEST OHIO Q. 12, 17
(1953).
" Ohio's first Constitution, drafted in 1802, proclaimed that "every free
government, being founded on [the people's] sole authority, [is] organized for the great
purpose of protecting their rights and liberties, and securing their independence .. "
OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1802). As one historian has marveled, "j]udging by
modem standards, [the Ohio Constitution is a] liberal document. Judging by the
standards of [1802] it was radical." DOWNES, supra note 134, at 1. In fact, when
compared with other state constitutions during the same time period, Ohio's first
Constitution "shows advances toward a more radical democratic view." CHADDOCK,
supra note 134, at 66. The theme of individual liberty permeated the 1802 document.
It declared, for example, "[A] frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of civil
government is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty." OHIo CONST.
art. VIII, § 18 (1802). General search warrants and standing armies in times of peace
were declared "dangerous to liberty." Id. at §§ 6 and 20 (1802). The Ohio
Constitution followed the Federal Bill of Rights in protecting freedom of speech and
assembly, and trial by jury. Id. at §§ 6, 19, 8. However, the 1802 Constitution was
distinctive from the federal document in a number of respects. Among positive rights
guaranteed to the people, the Ohio charter provided for redress in courts with "due
course of law." Id. at § 7 (1802). Moreover, the 1802 Constitution conferred a
"freedom of conscience" provision which remains to this day more expansive than the
Federal Free Exercise and Establishment clauses. Id. at § 3 (1802). Among restraints
on governmental power, the charter prohibited poll taxes. Id. at § 23. In the area of
criminal law, it prohibited disproportionate punishment, excessive bail, and treating
prisoners with "unnecessary rigor." Id. at §§ 14, 13, 10. Remarkably, more than 60
years before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Ohio Constitution prohibited
slavery. Id. at § 2.
"' During the second constitutional convention of 1851, the delegates agreed to keep
the spirit of the declaration of rights intact:
Resolved, that the [bill of rights] . . . of the Constitution of this

State, embracing the well settled and long established principle of
self-government . . . against the encroachments of power, and
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since. 138

This research demonstrates that state constitutions have their
own unique histories and therefore must be construed independently.
Judges confronted with such history will be less likely to treat the
state constitution as a meaningless echo of the federal charter. In
addition, the historical record may well establish a factual basis for
construing the state constitution more broadly than its federal
counterpart.

C. Long-standing Neglect of the Ohio Constitution by State
Court Judges
Perhaps the greatest challenge in utilizing state constitutions
is overcoming a judicial tradition in which state provisions are
regarded as coextensive with their federal counterparts. This
approach to state constitutional interpretation-dubbed the "dual"
approach-prevails in many states, and was described earlier in this
article.139 It is particularly pervasive in the Midwest.14 ° Once again,
Ohio provides a good illustration of the problems posed by this
tenacious doctrine.
When presented with state and federal constitutional claims,
securing to all the largest liberty ... accords, in its principles, with
the cherished sentiments of the people of Ohio, and ought ... to be
continued without material alteration as their bill of rights.
1 J.V. SMITH, REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR
THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1850-51, at 69 (1851;
reprinted 1933). Thus, though the 1851 delegates streamlined the provisions and made
some moderate textual changes, the Bill of Rights and its enduring principles of liberty
remained intact. Perhaps the best testament to their commitment to individual liberty
was the decision to move the Bill of Rights from Article VIII to the most prominent
location of all: Article I, the very beginning of the document. Id. Since the 1851
Constitution has endured to the present, the libertarian spirit that animated its drafters
should be borne in mind by those who construe its provisions.
13 See State v. Nieto, 131 N.E. 663, 666 (Ohio 1920) (Wanamaker, J., dissenting)
(stating that the delegates to Ohio's second constitutional convention in 1851
demonstrated the importance of the state Bill of Rights by moving it to the front of the
new constitution).
139See supra text accompanying note 31; see also State v. Hovlat, 385 N.W.2d 436,
447 (Neb. 1986) (Shanahan, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 34.
'" Sedler, supra note 33, at 474-75.
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Ohio courts consistently followed, until recently, the deferential
"dual" approach. t4" This excerpt from an Ohio Supreme Court
opinion was a typical response:
We look to federal case law to decide the right...
under both the state and federal provisions. The Ohio
Constitution's guarantees . . . are substantially
equivalent to the United States Constitution's
guarantees. . . . [Diecisions by the United States
Supreme Court can be utilized to give meaning to the
guarantees of .... the Ohio Constitution.142
Scholars lambasted Ohio's "reflexive obedience to the U.S. Supreme
Court's view," 143 its reluctance "to utilize independent state grounds
for state constitutional decisions,"'" its corresponding "[lack of
expertise] in interpreting its [own] constitution," 45 and the resulting
"fail[ure] to develop a body of state civil liberties law."46
In 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court simultaneously issued two
opinions, State v. Brown1 47 and State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v.
Tenth District Court of Appeals, 14' departing from the "dual"
approach in one, and adhering to it in the other.
In a rare display of independencei 49 the Court acknowledged

'4' See generally Mary C. Porter & Alan Tarr, The New JudicialFederalismand the
Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST.'L.J. 143 (1984) (showing
several instances where the Ohio Supreme Court failed to invoke Ohio State constitution,
and relied instead on the Federal Constitution).
142 State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66,67 (Ohio 1980).
14'E.g., Porter & Tarr, supra note 141, at 148.
'" Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw in Ohio and the Nation, 16 U. TOL.
L. REv. 391, 402-03 (1985).
4SPorter & Tart, supra note 141, at 154.

146id.

N.E.2d 113 (Ohio 1992).
N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1992).
4 On only one previous occasion had a majority of the Ohio Court expressly
recognized its power to depart from U.S. Supreme Court precedent when interpreting
analogous provisions of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Chatton, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1241
n.4 (Ohio 1984) (dictum) ("[Nionetheless, even should a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule be recognized for Fourth Amendment purposes, the question remains
whether we would likewise recognize such an exception under Section 14, Article I of
'47588
',588
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in Brown that it is free to deviate from U.S. Supreme Court
precedent when interpreting analogous provisions of the Ohio
Constitution. 5 ' And, for the first time, the Ohio Supreme Court
actually did depart from U.S. Supreme Court precedent, holding that
Article I, § 14 of the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection
against unreasonable search and seizure than the Federal Fourth
The Court's decision was unanimous."'
Amendment.'
Brown's impact remains uncertain, however, because Rear
DoorBookstore, issued the same day, expressly rejects the notion that
Ohio's free speech clause is any broader than the Federal First

the Ohio Constitution.").
'" Brown, 588 N.E.2d at 115 n.3.
SId. at 114 n.l.
2 In Brown, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the permissible scope of an
automobile search incident to arrest, under both the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. The
criminal defendant, Henry Brown, had been stopped for driving under the influence of
alcohol. Brown was arrested and placed in custody in a patrol car. After confining
Brown in the patrol car, the officer searched the passenger compartment of Brown's
automobile. During the course of this search, the officer opened a small unlocked
container in which he found LSD. Id. at 116. Brown was indicted on one count of drug
possession of LSD. His lawyer filed a motion to suppress the LSD found in his car,
arguing that this evidence was obtained by means of an unconstitutional search. Id. at
114. In determining the constitutionality of this search, the Ohio Supreme Court was
faced with a U.S. Supreme Court precedent, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981),
which greatly expanded the permissible scope, under the Fourth Amendment, of
automobile searches incident to arrest. In Belton, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically
recognized that it is permissible for an officer-after arresting the occupants of an
automobile and leading them away from the car-to return to the car and search its
contents, including any closed containers he may find. Id. at 455-56, 462. In Brown,
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the general applicability of Belton, but identified
certain distinguishing facts. 588 N.E.2d at 115. The Court acknowledged that these
distinguishing facts made it unclear whether the search of Brown's automobile was
permissible under Belton. Noting that it was free to construe the Ohio Constitution as
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than that imposed by the U.S.
Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically held that it would decline to follow
Belton insofar as it authorized the type of search performed in Brown's car, "If Belton
does stand for the proposition that a police officer may conduct a detailed search of an
automobile solely because he has arrested one of its occupants, on any charge, we
decline to adopt its rule." Id. at 352 (second emphasis added). In so holding, the Ohio
Supreme Court expressly recognized that it is free to depart from U.S. Supreme Court
precedent in construing analogous provisions of the Ohio Constitution. More important,
the Ohio Supreme Court for the first time specifically departed from U.S. Supreme
Court precedent in construing a counterpart provision in the Ohio Constitution.
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Amendment: "Appellants have cited no Ohio case, nor has our
research discovered any authority, for the proposition that the free
speech guarantees accorded by the Ohio Constitution are broader than
those provided under the United States Constitution."' '
In so
holding, the Court issued a rebuke to those who would advocate a
broader reading of the Ohio Constitution: "We have no reluctance in
declining to follow New York's dubious leadership to enlarge Ohio's
Constitutional protections [for free speech] to encompass the activities
occurring within the Rear Door Bookstore.""
Taken together, these decisions offer both hope and
discouragement to those who would invoke the Ohio Constitution as
a supplemental source of protection for reproductive freedom."'
Though recent decisions by lower courts evince a strong willingness

Rear Door Bookstore, 588 N.E.2d at 123-24.
I4d. at 124.
ISS Rear Door Bookstore's impact is limited somewhat by the fact that it was not
"

actually authored by any justice of the Ohio Supreme Court. Instead, the opinion is that
of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which the Ohio Supreme Court merely affirmed
and published as an appendix to its one-sentence order. Rear Door Bookstore, 588
N.E.2d at 117. Moreover, under Ohio law, only the syllabus "states the controlling point
or points of law decided." OHIO SuP. CT. R. I(B). The Supreme Court's syllabus in
Rear Door Bookstore contains no reference to the appellate court's restrictive
interpretation of Ohio's free speech clause. Moreover, in a more recent decision, the
Ohio Supreme Court appeared to recognize that Ohio's provision is slightly broader than
the Federal First Amendment:
The freedoms of speech, press, religion and assembly are guaranteed
together in the First Amendment because they share a core value:
the freedom of an individual to frame his thoughts and beliefs. The
Constitution of Ohio is even more specific; it guarantees to every
citizen freedom to 'speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all
subjects.' It follows that a citizen of Ohio is free to have 'sentiments
on all subjects.'
State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 457 (Ohio 1992) (quoting OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11)
(emphasis added)), vacated on Federal Constitutionalgrounds, 113 S.Ct. 2954 (1993).
Accord Urbana ex rel. Newlin v. Downing, 539 N.E.2d 140, 153 (Ohio 1989) (Brown,
J., dissenting) (the state constitutional right to freedom of speech is broader than the
federal right and "authorize[s] the expression of any sentiment on any subject so long as
the expression does not cause harm") (emphasis in original). Thus, there exists at least
some fragile authority for asserting that Ohio's free speech clause is not merely
coextensive with its federal counterpart.
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to breathe life into the Ohio Constitution, 15 6 the state supreme court
has in recent months continued its halting, inconsistent approach to
interpreting the state charter."5 7
These decisions show that efforts to develop the state
constitution are generating considerable agitation in Ohio's courts.
The next few years will be critical in determining whether
conservative states like Ohio join the growing number of jurisdictions
where state constitutions are enjoying a renaissance."5 8
D. Breathing Life into State ConstitutionalProvisions Long
Overshadowed by Their FederalCounterparts
This article will now demonstrate how state guarantees of
liberty, privacy, equal protection, and free speech may be used in
challenging abortion restrictions of the sort upheld in Casey.

1. Liberty/Privacy
Casey-type restrictions violate state constitutional guarantees
of liberty and privacy by abridging the bodily integrity and personal

'3 See, e.g., Ferner v. Toledo-Lucas County Convention & Visitor's Bureau, Inc.,
610 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ohio Ct. App.) (holding that the state free speech clause is
broader than the Federal First Amendment); Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio
C.P. May 27, 1992) (striking down abortion restrictions under liberty, equal protection,
free speech, and freedom of conscience guarantees in the Ohio Constitution).
"' Compare Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221 (Ohio 1994)
(holding that the free speech clause of the Ohio Constitution affords no greater access
to shopping malls for speech activities than the Federal First Amendment) and State v.
Wyant, 68 Ohio St. 3d 162 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the state free speech clause
imposes no greater restrictions on legislative power to enact "ethnic intimidation" statutes
than does the Federal First Amendment) with Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35,
42 (Ohio 1993) (asserting that "the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent
force," which may be construed to afford greater protection for civil liberties than the
U.S. Constitution). Dissenting in Slanco, Justice Craig Wright criticized the Court's
inconsistency in construing the state charter, observing that "this court has taken one step
forward but two steps backward in recent cases involving the interpretation of the Ohio
Constitution." 68 Ohio St. 3d at 225.
'" See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
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autonomy of women, and by placing undue burdens on the capacity
of women to make procreative and medical decisions free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. Before turning to an analysis
of the liberty and privacy guarantees under the Ohio Constitution, let
us first examine how such provisions have been employed in other
jurisdictions.
a. In Other Jurisdictions, Courts Have Found Enhanced
Protectionfor Reproductive Freedom in State Constitutional
Guarantees of Liberty and Privacy
In some jurisdictions, courts have found enhanced protection
for reproductive freedom in state constitutional guarantees of liberty
and privacy. In California 59 and Florida," 6 the courts relied upon
express privacy guarantees contained in their state constitutions., 6"
In New Jersey 62 and Connecticut,1 63 the courts found an implied
5 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981)
(applying strict scrutiny in finding that the challenged regulation unduly burdened a
woman's fundamental right of privacy).
160In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (applying strict scrutiny in finding that
the challenged regulation unduly burdened a woman's fundamental right of privacy).
161 Some state constitutions expressly guarantee a right of privacy. See e.g., ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; D. C. CONST. art.
I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; L.A. CONST. art. I, § 5; and
MONT. CONST. art. I, § 10.
162Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982). In Byrne, the New Jersey
Supreme Court struck down a state Medicaid funding scheme which subsidized only lifesaving abortions and excluded medically necessary abortions. Id. at 932. The court first
noted the "more expansive" liberty grant under its state charter: "All persons are by
nature free and independent, and have certain natural and inalienable rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 1. The court concluded, "[bly declaring the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of safety and happiness, [the provision] protects the right of privacy, a right that was
implicit in the 1844 Constitution." Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933. The court then
observed that this state right to privacy had been invoked to protect adult consensual
sexual conduct, the right to sterilization, and the right to terminate life support. Id. A
common theme running through these cases was the precept that sometimes "an
individual's right to control her own body and life overrides the state's general interest
in preserving life." Id. Accordingly, the court deemed the right to privacy, and the
right of "all pregnant women" to choose abortion, fundamental. Id. at 934. The court
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noted that the choice to abort was "one of the most intimate decisions in human
experience. . . that should be made by the woman in consultation with a few trusted
advisors, such as her doctor, without undue government interference." Id. Since the
funding restriction implicated a fundamental right, the court employed a strict scrutiny
analysis.
The court determined that the statute violated an indigent woman's
"fundamental right to control her body and destiny" by withholding funds for medically
necessary abortions. Id. at 933.
"6Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. 1986). In Maher, the Connecticut Superior
Court struck down a Medicaid funding scheme which funded only abortions necessary
to save the life of the mother. The court held that Connecticut's implied right of privacy
included the right to preserve one's health and the right to choose an abortion. Id. at
150-53. To determine the source of the right, the court looked to the state constitution:
"The preamble ...reserves to the people 'the liberties, rights and privileges which they
have derived from their ancestors'; and the preface clause to the declaration of rights.
...broadly incorporates the concept of ordered liberty by stating '[t]hat the great and
essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and established.
Id. In construing this expansive language, the court reasoned that the framers
of the 1818 Constitution intended that "the right of privacy is implicitly guaranteed under
our state charter of liberty." Id. The court noted that its state constitution not only
constrained governmental power, but also conferred positive rights upon the people. Id.
While some positive rights were enumerated, "others were implied.., in the preamble
of the Constitution and that of the declaration of rights; and all are guaranteed by the due
process clause." Id. Among these implied rights were fundamental or "'natural rights,'
which the people took for granted as being deeply rooted in the core of liberty." Id. at
150-53. The court cited one framer's conception of natural rights as "'the enjoyment
and exercise of a power to do as we think proper, without any other restraint than what
results from the law of nature, or what may be denominated the moral law.'" Id. at
149. In passing, the court noted that while natural rights analysis may be in disrepute
today, it is highly useful in determining the intent of the framers. id. at 149 n.32.
Next, the court discerned the nature of fundamental rights. Such rights are inherently
rooted in "'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions."' Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67
(1932)). Citing the famous dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), the court concluded that "the right to be let alone is fundamental and
this right of privacy is older than the Bill of Rights." Maher, 515 A.2d at 150.
Accordingly, the court concluded: "It is absolutely clear that the right of privacy is
implicit in Connecticut's ordered liberty." Id. The court went on to describe the
privacy right in expansive terms. It stated unequivocally that the privacy right secured
a woman's exercise of procreative freedom: "If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual . . . to be free of unwarranted government intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Id. (quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977)). Also, like the court in Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 934, the Maher court
stated that privacy shields the physician-patient relationship from undue governmental
interference. Privacy "encompasses the doctor-patient relationship regarding the
woman's health, including the physician's right to advise the woman on the abortion

1993]

THE ROAD NOT TAKEN

41

privacy right in the sweeping liberty guarantees set forth in their state
constitutions. Likewise, courts in Massachusetts,6 1 New York, 6 and

decision based upon her well-being." Maher, 515 A.2d at 150. Finally, the court
deemed as fundamental "the right to make decisions which are necessary for the
preservation and protection of one's health." Id. If not within the ambit of privacy, this
right is free-standing and fundamental, for "at every stage of pregnancy, the woman's
health is paramount." Id. at 150. Both the New Jersey and Connecticut courts found
an implicit right to privacy within the expansive liberty. provisions of their state charters.
Both courts suggested that the privacy right was so "fundamental to the concept of
ordered liberty" that it need not be enumerated expressly. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
'" Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981). In Moe, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated a state Medicaid funding scheme that
subsidized only abortions to save the mother's life. The funding scheme violated an
implicit privacy right stemming from the state constitution's due process clause. Id. at
402. The court held that due process requires governmental restraint in interfering with
the positive right to privacy. First, the court embraced the holding of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973): "Although we are not unaware of the criticism leveled at Roe, we have
accepted the formulation of rights that it announced as an integral part of our
jurisprudence." Id. at 398. The court explained that the privacy right shielding family,
sexuality, and reproductive freedom is "but one aspect of a far broader grant" of
personal autonomy. Id. This autonomy right demands that "'the sanctity of individual
free choice"' and the freedom of "'bodily integrity"' be fundamental. Id. at 399 (quoting
Belehertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass-. 1977)). To protect the
right to privacy, due process requires nonintervention by the state. The court had twice
defended a woman's right to choose abortion on state constitutional grounds. Moe, 417
N.E.2d at 398. These Massachusetts cases respect a "'private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter."' Id. at 398-99 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944)). "'We would not order either a husband or a wife to do what is necessary
to conceive a child or to prevent conception, any more than we would order either party
...to make the other happy. Some things must be left to private agreement."' Id. at
398 (quoting Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974)). The Massachusetts court,
noting that the due process guarantees in its state constitution provided more protection
than the federal analogue, concluded that the state due process clause "'forbids the state
to interpose material obstacles to the effectuation of a woman's counseled decision to
terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester."' Id. at 398-99 (quoting Framingham
v. Southborough, 367 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1977)). The court further explained that
governmental regulations impinging on the right to privacy must be neutral to satisfy due
process. Id. at 400. "[Olnee [the legislature] chooses to enter the constitutionally
protected area of choice, it must do so with genuine indifference." Id. at 402.
Accordingly, the court determined that the exclusion of medically necessary abortions
from the Medicaid scheme was impermissibly discriminatory and that the woman's
exercise of her right to choose abortion outweighed the state's interest in protecting fetal
life. Id.
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West Virginia.. relied upon substantive due process guarantees in
their state constitutions.

' Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1993). In Hope, a New York
trial court struck down a complete ban on funded abortions through the state Prenatal
Care Assistance Program for indigent women. The court held that the funding
restriction was "contrary to the constitutional right to privacy guaranteed by the due
process clause of the New York State Constitution." Id. at 976-77. New York's due
process clause, providing that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law," N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, had historically been construed as
granting broader protection than its federal counterpart. Hope, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
The court noted that since the clause was enacted prior to the Federal Fourteenth
Amendment and had distinct language, an independent construction was appropriate. Id.
The court acknowledged that New York decriminalized abortion three years before Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), "to recognize that the state had no right to interfere with
the most personal and important decision a woman can make regarding her body and her
life." Id. at 976. Like the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the New York court
stressed the importance of governmental noninterference with the right to privacy:
In constitutional terms, the right to privacy involves freedom of
choice, the broad general right to make decisions concerning one's
self and to conduct one's self in accordance with those decisions free

of governmental restraint or interference. .

.

. The essence of this

freedom is the absence of governmental interference in the personal
decisions concerning contraception, procreation, and abortion, to
name a few that fall within the ambit of. . .privacy.
Id. at 977. The court found that the funding ban unduly interfered with the right of
indigent women to choose abortion. By excluding all funding of abortion, the prenatal
care program "impermissibly pressures an eligible indigent woman toward childbirth,
abridging a constitutionally protected right." Id. at 979. The discriminatory program
allowing health care only for childbirth expenses "effectively precludes an eligible
woman from any real choice in the fundamental decision 'to bear or beget a child."' Id.
(quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977)). In
addition, the regulation "wrests control from the pregnant woman over her body and
health." Id. at 980. The court ruled that the regulation was not "fairly, justly,
reasonably, or rationally related to the promotion of the health, comfort, safety, and
welfare of society." Id. at 978. Thus, the court extended the reach of the implicit
privacy right to include "the right of a pregnant woman to choose an abortion where it
is medically indicated." Id.
"6Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, 1993 WL 522706 (W. Va. Dec. 20,
1993) (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion under substantive due
process and equal protection theories advanced under the West Virginia Constitution).
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b. Ohio's Constitution Affords Heightened Protection for
Reproductive Freedom Under Guarantees of Liberty and Privacy
i. Textual Analysis
The U.S. Constitution mentions liberty only in the context of
due process: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ."167 By
contrast, the Ohio Constitution confers a sweeping grant of individual
liberty: "All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety. ,"'6
Since the liberty right guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution
is neither tied to nor limited by a due process clause, it may be
deemed to provide greater substantive protection for all Ohio citizens
than that afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Since it is liberty that
forms the very foundation of reproductive freedom,169 and since the
liberty clause of the Ohio Constitution is broader than that of the
U.S. Constitution, Ohio's liberty guarantee may be viewed as
providing heightened protection for reproductive autonomy.
The New Jersey Supreme Court construed an identical
provision in its state constitution as granting a fundamental privacy
right. 7 ' The Connecticut court likewise relied upon similar language
in its constitution to find that privacy is implicit in that State's
ordered liberty. 17
"' More important, those courts found that the broad
language of the liberty guarantees in their state constitutions created

167U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 216 (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Roe v. Wade and its progeny are not so much about a medical
procedure as they are about a woman's fundamental right to selfdetermination. Those cases serve to vindicate the idea that 'liberty,'
if it means anything, must entail freedom from governmental
domination in making the most intimate and personal of decisions.
Id.
'°Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 937 (1982). See supra note 162.
...
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 148-49 (Conn. 1986). See supra note 163.
'68

'69 Casey,
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greater protection for reproductive freedom than that afforded by
federal law. Since Ohio's liberty provision is expressed in similarly
broad language, it too should be deemed to confer greater protection
for reproductive freedom than that supplied by the Federal
Constitution.
ii. Application to Casey-type Provisions
The foregoing textual analysis, coupled with the historical
perspective outlined above,172 demonstrates that the Ohio Constitution
was animated by a powerful libertarian spirit, and that it contains a
sweeping guarantee of liberty. Moreover, Ohio's liberty provision
affords greater protection than that contained in the Federal
Constitution, and its sweeping language embraces an implied right of
privacy.
In fact, Ohio courts have recognized a constitutional right to
privacy under the liberty guarantee in Article I, § 1, of the Ohio
Constitution. An Ohio trial court enjoined a school board regulation
governing dress codes and hair-length restrictions which "invad[ed]
the privacy and dignity of the student . . . in the most intimate and
personal way."' 73 Turning to Article I, § 1, the court noted: "It
seems ... strikingly important that our founding fathers placed this
section first in the Bill of Rights. It represents the embodiment of
what this nation stands for. It enshrines in our Constitution our
dedication to individual freedom and dignity." 74 The court then
identified a broad right of individual privacy:
In non-legal terms, Section 1 establishes the principle
that every American has the right to be let alone and
to be regulated by the government only so far as such
regulation is shown to be necessary to protect others
or to advance legitimate governmental purposes. This
constitutional provision places a heavy responsibility
If See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
173 Jacobs

v. Benedict, 301 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ohio C.P. 1973); aff'd, 316 N.E.2d

898 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
174 Id. at 725.

19931

THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
on any governmental body to justify its interference
with a citizen's freedom, his right to enjoy liberty of
decision and to seek happiness in his own way.175

Accordingly, the court concluded that the regulation was "antithetical
to our American tradition of rugged individualism and wholly
repugnant to the laws and Constitution of Ohio. ,176
This opinion, later affirmed,177 offers some lessons on the
interpretation of Article I, § 1. The court first looked at the text and
discerned the intent of the framers by placing the provision first in
the Constitution and first in the Bill of Rights. 178 The court
recognized the principles of individual dignity and autonomy that
animate Ohio's Constitution in declaring a fundamental right to
privacy. The court formulated a standard to justify governmental
interference: the intrusion must be necessary to advance a legitimate
state purpose. This formulation, with its emphasis upon necessity, is
closely akin to the "strict scrutiny" standard in federal constitutional
jurisprudence. 179 This is the sort of independent interpretation that
state courts should be encouraged to pursue when construing their
own constitutions.
In the intervening years, Ohio courts have held that the
protection of personal privacy covers those areas which are
"'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
[involving] matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child-rearing and education. "" They have
noted that "the family unit, which performs the social function of
child-rearing, regardless of its composition, . . . is constitutionally
protected against governmental intrusion not supported by a
compelling state interest."181 Likewise, Ohio courts have held that

'Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
'17Id. at 728.
'7 Jacobs, 316 N.E.2d at 901.
1 Jacobs, 301 N.E.2d at 725.
' Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) and Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973) with Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
ISOWilson v. Patton, 551 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
" Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Dep't, 421 N.E.2d 152, 155-56 (Ohio 1981).
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adult, consensual sexual conduct done in private is protected, 8 2 and
that "the choice not to procreate, as part of one's privacy, has
become (subject to certain limitations) a Constitutional guarantee. 183
These cases demonstrate that the Ohio Constitution contains
an implied right of privacy affording protection for reproductive
freedom. An opinion of the Ohio Attorney General has confirmed
that such a privacy right exists.' Though never previously invoked
in the context of abortion regulations, Ohio's right to privacy is
sufficiently broad to protect women from the unwarranted
governmental intrusion that Casey-type provisions represent.
2. Equal Protection'
Such restrictions also violate constitutional guarantees of equal
protection because they impose burdens upon women's reproductive
choices that are not imposed upon the reproductive choices of men,
because they perpetuate myths and stereotypes that demean women
and hinder their ability to participate fully and equally in society, and
because they deprive women, but not men, of a fundamental right.
Unfettered freedom of choice regarding abortion "is central
to a woman's control not only of her own body, but also to the
control of her social role and personal destiny. "'86 "The implications
of an unwanted child for a woman's education, employment
opportunities, and associational opportunities (often including

'

City of Columbus v. Scott, 353 N.E.2d 858 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).

' Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 469, 499 (Ohio 1976).
'

Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-095, at n.3, 1982 Ohio AG LEXIS 14 (Nov. 15,

1982).
' This section of the article, though intended primarily to support state
constitutional cliams, is applicable in part to equal protection claims under the Federal
Constitution. See infra notes 238-60 and accompanying text.
'" Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term: Toward Equal Citizenship
Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 57-58 (1977); see Committee
to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 792 (Cal. 1981) (striking down
abortion funding restrictions on state liberty, privacy, and equal protection grounds).
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marriage opportunities) are of enormous proportion."' 87
If a man is the involuntary source of a child-if he is
forbidden, for example, to practice contraception-the
violation of his personality is profound. But if a
woman is forced to bear a child-not simply to
provide an ovum but to carry the child to term-the
invasion is incalculably greater. .

.

. [I]t is difficult

to imagine a clearer case of bodily intrusion, even if
the original conception was in some sense
voluntary. 88
In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he ability
of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives."' 89 Thus, when a statute imposes burdens upon
women's reproductive choices that are not imposed upon the
reproductive choices of men, that statute violates principles of equal
protection:
[I]t might be possible to discern an invidious
discrimination against women, or at least a
constitutionally problematic subordination of women,
in the law's very indifference to the biological reality
that sometimes requires them, but never requires
[men], to resort to abortion procedures if they are to

avoid pregnancy and childbearing. 9 '
Equal protection challenges to direct restrictions on abortion have
rarely been attempted. Though challenges to abortion funding

18Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 641
n.90 (1980). See Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 793
(Cal. 1981).
188LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1340 (2d. ed.
1988).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) (plurality opinion).
190
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICEs 244 (1985) (cited in Doe v. Maher,
515 A.2d 134, 160 (Conn. 1986) (striking down abortion funding restrictions on state
constitutional liberty, privacy, and equal protection grounds)).
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limitations have been pursued-unsuccessfully under the Federal
Constitution, 9 ' but with great success under state constitutions' 92equal protection arguments have only recently been directed at Caseytype provisions.' 93 This article will turn first to the abortion funding
cases, examining how state equal protection guarantees can be more
potent than their federal counterpart in restraining governmental
interference with abortion." 94 I will show that the heightened equal
protection scrutiny embodied in the funding cases applies just as
readily to Casey-type restrictions.'" 5 Next, I will explore how to
proceed with state court judges who are not inclined to read their

19'Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the government can
constitutionally refuse to fund medically-necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977) (holding that states can constitutionally refuse to furnish Medicaid financing
for non-therapeutic abortions, even while making Medicaid funding available for
childbirth expenses).
"s Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. 1981)
(invoking the California Constitution's express right to privacy); Doe v. Maher, 515
A.2d 134 (Conn. 1986) (invoking the equal protection and liberty provisions of the
Connecticut Constitution); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (invoking the
Florida Constitution's express privacy guarantee); Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417
N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the substantive due
process guarantees in the Massachusetts Constitution); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450
A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the New Jersey
Constitution's liberty guarantee, and invoking the state equal protection clause); Hope
v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (invoking both the liberty and equal
protection provisions of the New York Constitution), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App.
Div. 1993), dismissed, 601 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1993); Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc.
v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P. 2d 1247 (Or. 1983) (invoking the privileges
and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution); Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v.
Panepinto, 1993 WL 522706 (W. Va. Dec., 17, 1993) (invoking equal protection and
substantive due process guarantees under the West Virginia Constitution). A similar
lawsuit was recently filed in Florida. Doe v. State, No. CL-93-2022-AJ (Fla. Cir. Ct.)
(complaint filed March 1993) (invoking the state's express guarantees of privacy and
equal protection in challenging a scheme that denies state Medicaid coverage for
medically necessary abortions but funds childbirth expenses). But see Fischer v.
Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985) (rejecting state equal protection
and state equal rights theories).
'" Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. Ct. May 27, 1992) (striking
down a mandatory 24-hour delay and biased counseling provisions under the state equal
protection clause), id. at 15, 28 (relying as well upon the Federal Equal Protection
Clause).
194 See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
19'See infra notes 208-37 and accompanying text.
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equal protection clauses so broadly. I will demonstrate that it may
be possible to invalidate Casey-type provisions even under a state
equal protection
clause that is deemed coextensive with the federal
196
guarantee.

a. In Several Jurisdictions, Courts Have Found Enhanced
Protectionfor Reproductive Freedom in State Constitutional
Guaranteesof Equal Protection
Relying upon equal protection guarantees in their
state' 97constitutions, courts in New Jersey, 98 West Virginia, 99
Connecticut, 2" New York,2' and California2 l struck down laws that
burdened a woman's capacity to obtain an abortion.2 3 These cases,
196See infra notes 238-60 and accompanying text.
'9 The vast majority of state constitutions contain an equal protection guarantee:
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 13; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2; HAW. CONST. art.
I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; IND. CONST. art. I, § 23;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 2; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3;
ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46; MASS.
CONST. part 1, art. I; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2; MO. CONST. art. I, § 2; MONT.
CONST. art. I, § 4; N.H. CONST. art I, art. II; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11; N.C. CONST. art. l, § 19; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2; OR. CONST.
art. I, § 20; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 12; W.VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 1; and WYo. CONST. art. I, § 3.
I Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934-37 (N.J. 1982).
Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, No. 21924 (W. Va. Dec. 17, 1993).
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 157-62 (Conn. 1986) (relying on both the state
equal protection clause and the state equal rights amendment).
20 Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 981-82 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595
N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1993).
1 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 789 (Cal. 1981)
(employing an "unconstitutional conditions" analysis developed under the state
constitution, the California Supreme Court held that statutory provisions which
"discriminatorily deny" generally available medical benefits to poor women solely
because they choose to have an abortion are invalid).
' But see Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985)
(rejecting state equal protection and state equal rights amendment theories in a challenge
to abortion funding restrictions); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah
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which form part of a larger trend in state equal protection
litigation, 2' all involved restrictions on public funding of abortion.
The New York court endorsed plaintiffs' argument that "the
right to choose . . . abortion is a fundamental precondition of a
woman's exercise of equality under the law and [by restricting
abortion] the state controls and alters the lives of women in a way
that it does not control and alter the lives of men."2 5 The
Connecticut court concluded: "Since only women become pregnant,
discrimination against pregnancy by not funding abortion when it is
medically necessary and when all other medical expenses are paid by
the state for both men and women is sex-oriented discrimination."2"
In striking down a similar program, the California Supreme
Court observed:
[W]e cannot characterize the statutory scheme as
merely providing a public benefit which the individual
is free to accept or refuse without any
impairment of her constitutional rights. [T7he state is
utilizing its resources to ensure that women who are
too poor to obtain medical care on their own will
exercise their right of procreative choice only in the
1992) (rejecting state equal protection, freedom-of-religion, and establishment-of-religion
claims in a challenge to abortion access restrictions).
4 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (recognizing, in
dictum, that the state equal protection clause may confer a right to same-sex marriages);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (striking down the state's
sodomy law on the grounds that it violated the state constitution's right to privacy and
equal protection and expressly rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive privacy and
equal protection analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
m Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 981 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d
948 (App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1993). The court concluded
that "[wihile the Legislature can express a preference for childbirth over abortion and
allocate resources accordingly, it cannot transgress constitutional principles to achieve
this result." Id. at 979. Thus, the court struck down the abortion funding restrictions
on state equal protection grounds. Id. at 981-82.
20 Doe'v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (emphasis added).
Echoing this analysis, an Oregon court concluded: "It may well be that if the medical
assistance program is a comprehensive one providing all medically necessary services
for men but not for women if those services involve an abortion, the program denies
equal privileges to women because they are women."
Planned Parenthood v.
Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247, 1260 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
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manner approved by the state.2 "7

b. The Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny Employed in Some
States to Invalidate Abortion Funding Restrictions Applies Just as
Readily to Casey-type Provisions.
In each of the foregoing cases, state equal protection clauses
were construed to prevent the government from placing unequal
burdens on the reproductive freedom of men and women. Though
each case involved public funding of abortion, the rationale is equally
applicable to Casey-type restrictions.
In both contexts, the
government is placing burdens on the reproductive choices of women
that are not imposed on the reproductive choices of men. These four
cases exemplify the diversity of approaches employed by state courts
in construing their equal protection guarantees.
In Hope v. Perales, the New York court employed an
approach that bears the closest resemblance to federal equal
protection analysis.20 8 It held that "[ilf a statute burdens a
'fundamental interest' or employs a 'suspect' classification, it must
withstand strict scrutiny. "2' Echoing the federal standard, the court
observed that in order to survive strict scrutiny, the statute must be
"necessary to promote a compelling state interest and narrowly
tailored to achieve that purpose."21 But the New York court parted
company with federal law in declaring access to medically prescribed
abortions a "fundamental right," 21 ' and, consequently, it employed

o Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 793 (Cal. 1981)
(emphasis added).
2m See Hope, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
2"'Id. at 981.
210 Id.
211 id. Casey leaves considerable doubt whether abortion may be regarded as a
"fundamental right" under the Federal Constitution. See 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (plurality
opinion) (adopting a new "undue burden" standard by which strict scrutiny will be
applied only to those regulations that impose "a substantial obstacle to the woman's
exercise of the right to choose"). "Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all
governmental attempts to influence a woman's decision on behalf of the potential life
within her as unwarranted. This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the
recognition that there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout
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strict scrutiny to invalidate the challenged limitation on abortion
funding.212
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized the same strict
scrutiny standard for equal protection violations that burden suspect
classes and fundamental rights. 213 The court announced, however,
that mid-level scrutiny under New Jersey's equal protection clause is
more exacting than that under the federal charter: "[W]here an
importantpersonalright is affected by governmental action, the [New
Jersey Supreme] Court often requires the public authority to
demonstrate a greater 'public need' than is traditionally required in
construing the Federal Constitution. ' 21 4 Standing by itself, this
heightened standard would represent an encouraging prospect for
gender-discrimination claims. But the New Jersey court held that
freedom of choice is afundamental right, 215 and therefore employed
strict scrutiny in striking down the funding limitation.21 6
Thus, the New York and New Jersey decisions demonstrate
that equal protection challenges to abortion regulations may be
successfully pursued under state constitutions if the court can be
persuaded that freedom of choice is a fundamental right. The New
Jersey decision suggests, moreover, that victory may be possible
without the benefit of a strict scrutiny standard. Even if the court
refuses to recognize abortion as a fundamental right, its mid-level
scrutiny may be sufficiently exacting to invalidate abortion
regulations. Finally, these decisions need not be confined to the

pregnancy." Id. at 2818. Conspicuously absent from the plurality opinion was any
reference to freedom of choice as a "fundamental" right. Justice Blackmun likewise
avoided any talk of "fundamental" rights, emphasizing instead the need for reconciling
"the liberty of the woman and the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life ...."
Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
212Hope, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 981-82.
213Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982).
214Id. at 936 (emphasis added) (quoting Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Township.
v. Weymouth Township., 364 A.2d 1016, 1036 (N.J. 1976)).
21' Byrne, 450 A.2d at 934 (holding that the right to choose to have an abortion is
a fundamental right of all pregnant women).
216 Id. at 936 ("The statute affects the right of poor pregnant women to choose
between alternative necessary medical services. No compelling state interest justifies
that discrimination, and the statute denies equal protection to those exercising their
constitutional right to choose a medically necessary abortion.") (emphasis added).
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abortion funding context; their sweeping recognition that legislative
obstacles to abortion impose a discriminatory burden on women is
broad enough to implicate Casey-type restrictions as well.
The California Supreme Court employed a very different
analysis in striking down a scheme of funding restrictions.
Employing an "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine developed under
the state's equal protection clause, the court invalidated the
restrictions because they "discriminatorily den[ied]" medical benefits
to poor women who were merely trying to exercise their freedom to
choose an abortion.217 This "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine,
which essentially holds that a citizen cannot be penalized by the
government for exercising a constitutional right," 8 will not apply as
readily to Casey-type restrictions. The doctrine has been developed
exclusively in the context of receiving public benefits conditioned
"on the waiver or forfeiture of [various] constitutional rights. 1219
This does not mean, however, that an equal protection claim against
Casey-type restrictions is destined for failure under the California
Constitution. It merely means that the "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine will not likely apply in such a case. Similar claims advanced
in New York and New Jersey would be available.
Finally, the Connecticut case holds out a special promise for
those states whose constitutions contain an equal rights amendment
("ERA"). The court struck down abortion funding restrictions not
only under its equal protection clause, 220 but also, separately, under
its ERA. 221 Like the New York and New Jersey decisions discussed
above, the Connecticut court employed a strict scrutiny standard
under its equal protection clause after holding that the regulation
infringed upon a "fundamental right."2 22 The court further observed
that the women challenging this scheme had an even stronger case

217Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981).
218 Id. at 796.

219 Id. at 797 (applying the doctrine to an area normally reserved for equal protection

analysis).
2 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 158-59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
2' Id. at 159-60. The court also invalidated the funding restrictions under a separate
liberty/privacy analysis. See id. at 146-57.
2 Id. at 159.
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under Connecticut's ERA.223
In pursuing its ERA analysis, the Connecticut court observed:
By adopting the ERA, the "people of this state and
their legislators have unambiguously indicated an
intent to abolish sex discrimination."

. .

. Since time

immemorial, women's biology and ability to bear
children have been used as a basis for discrimination
against them. .

.

. This discrimination has had a

devastating effect upon women. 224
The court asserted that the framers of Connecticut's ERA intended
that "pregnancy discrimination would come within the [amendment's]
purview ...

should be subject to heightened judicial review. "225 The

court concluded: "In sum, by adopting the ERA, Connecticut
determined that the state should no longer be permitted to
disadvantage women because of their sex, including their
reproductive capabilities." 226 The court reasoned that "[slince only
women become pregnant," any funding scheme that effectively
forecloses their access to abortion "when it is medically necessary
22

Id. at 159.

Connecticut's ERA was adopted as an amendment to its equal

protection clause in 1974. Id. at 158. Prior to that amendment, the state equal
protection clause read as follows:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be
subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or
enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race,
color, ancestry or national origin.
Id. at 158 n.50. Section 20 was amended on Nov. 27, 1974 and again on Nov. 28,
1984. Section 20 now reads as follows:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be
subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or
enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion,
race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental
disability.
Id. at 158 n.51.
I Id. at 159 (citations omitted) (quoting Evening Sentinel v. NOW, 357 A.2d 498,
503 (Conn. 1975)).
2 Id. at 160.
2Doe,
515 A.2d at 160; see id. at 158 (discussing the 1974 adoption of
Connecticut's ERA and displaying the language of the state's equal protection clause as
it appeared prior to and after the amendment).
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and when all other medical expenses are paid by the state for both
' and therefore
men and women is sex-oriented discrimination,"227
228
violates the state ERA.
This decision shows that state ERAs can be enormously
helpful in challenging abortion regulations.229 In the same way that
express privacy provisions are often deemed more potent than implicit
guarantees, 3° an ERA can be employed as a more potent equal
protection clause. Indeed, some states have interpreted their ERAs
as requiring absolute scrutiny, a standard even more exacting than
traditional strict scrutiny.231 In applying absolute scrutiny, the court
will not consider any justification for gender-discrimination once it is
found. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, has held that:
The ERA, on the other hand, is a very different
animal from the equal protection clause-indeed, it
has no counterpart in the federal constitution. The
ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex and is not subject to even the narrow
exceptions permitted under traditional "strict
scrutiny." . . . The ERA mandates equality in the

strongest of terms and absolutely prohibits the
sacrifice of equality for any state interest, no matter
how compelling, though separate equality may be
permissible in some very limited circumstances.232
In addition to Connecticut and Washington, thirteen other states have

227Id.
2

at 159.

Id. at 160.

But see Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985)
(rejecting state equal protection and state equal rights theories in a challenge to abortion
funding restrictions).
I See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App.3d
831, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the express privacy guarantee contained
in the California Constitution is broader than the federal right to privacy and striking
down a statute requiring parental consent for minors to receive an abortion because it
violated the California Constitution's express privacy guarantee).
11 National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash.
1983).
22 Id. at 1102 (emphasis in original).
"'
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adopted ERAs.233 Some, like Connecticut, simply amended their
equal protection clauses to include express references to sex or
gender.234 Others, like Washington, adopted provisions based on the
ill-fated federal model. 2 " Two states, Utah236 and Wyoming, 2" have
equal protection clauses containing express references to sex, but the
language, lying dormant since the 19th century, has never been given
force or effect. Largely untapped, state ERAs can be a powerful
source of protection against governmental restrictions on women's
reproductive autonomy.

c. Casey-type Restrictions Are Vulnerable to Challenge Even
Under a State Equal Protection Clause Deemed Coextensive with
the Federal Guarantee
Not every state court judge will be willing to perform an
expansive interpretation of the state equal protection clause. It may
nevertheless be possible to invalidate Casey-type restrictions under a
state equal protection clause deemed coextensive with the federal
guarantee. Confronted with a judge who is determined to impose a
lock-step construction on the state and federal equal protection

I

ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 1972); COLORADO CONST. art. II, § 29 (amended

1972); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 (amended 1974); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended
1972); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 1974); MA. CONST.
DECLARATIONOF RIGHTS, Art. 46 (amended 1972); MASS. CONST. part I, art. 1 (amended
1976); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (amended 1972); N.H. CONST. part I, art. 2 (amended
1974); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18 (amended 1973); PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (amended
1971); TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 3a (amended 1972); VA. CoNST. art. I, § 11 (amended 1971);
WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1 (amended 1972).
234 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 (amended 1974); LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 1974);
MASS. CONST. part I, art. 1 (amended 1976); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (amended 1972);
N.H. CONST. part I, art. 2 (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a (amended 1972);
VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
2" ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 1972); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 (amended
1972); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 21 (amended 1972); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 (amended
1970); MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46 (amended 1972); N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 18 (amended 1973); PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (amended 1971); WASH. CONST. art. 31, §
1 (amended 1972).
2M UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1896).
27 WYo. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. VI, § 1 (1890).
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clauses, it will be necessary to proceed with the sort of analysis long
employed under the federal charter. Federal equal protection analysis
is triggered in two different contexts-class-based discriminatione'
and deprivations of fundamental rights.239 This article will address
both prongs in turn.

i. Gender-based Discrimination
Writing separately in Casey, Justice Blackmun observed that
abortion restrictions raise issues outside the realm of liberty and
privacy; they implicate equal protection concerns as well:
A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees
of gender equality. State restrictions on abortion
compel women to continue pregnancies they otherwise
might terminate. By restricting the right to terminate
pregnancies, the State conscripts women's bodies into
its service, forcing women to continue their
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in
most instances, provide years of maternal care. The
State does not compensate women for their services;
instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter
of course. This assumption-that women can simply
be forced to accept the "natural" status and incidents
of motherhood- appears to rest upon a conception of
women's role that has triggered the protection of the
Equal Protection Clause. The joint opinion [in Casey]
recognizes that these assumptions about women's
place in society "are no longer consistent with our
understanding of the family, the individual, or the

m See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)
(gender-based classification struck down).
2'9
See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540-43 (1942) (applying strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to strike down compulsory sterilization law).
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In response to an equal protection claim, the court must first
determine whether the regulation is in fact a gender-based
classification. 24 In fending off such a claim, the government will
likely argue that Casey-type restrictions operate alike on all persons
similarly situated-women seeking an abortion. Because abortion is
a medical procedure applicable only to pregnant women, abortion
regulations make no gender-based classification. According to this
argument, such restrictions cannot violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
This argument will prove formidable, but it contains flaws
that may be exploited. The best response is that the government, in
identifying the range of "similarly situated" people, draws an unduly
narrow map. Men and women both engage in sexual activity. Men
and women both make reproductive decisions. Men and women are
both affected by the consequences of an unplanned pregnancy. Men
and women both have an interest in retaining their reproductive
autonomy. Restrictions on the availability of abortion cripple the
reproductive autonomy of women, impairing their capacity to
participate fully in society and furthering their perennial subjugation.
As Laurence Tribe observes: "To ignore woman's unique role in
human reproduction is to allow women to lay claim to equality only
insofar as they are like men. ,242
A statute restricting access to abortion constitutes a genderbased classification per se because it classifies on the basis of a trait
which, as a matter of biology, only women possess. The direct
impact of a measure restricting abortion falls on a class of people that
consists exclusively of women.243 A gender-based impact occurs in
24

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2846-47 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,

concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
24 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-725 (1982).
2 I.AuRENcE H. TRIBE, AmIFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-29, at 1303 (2d ed. 1988).
23

Cf. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981)

(treating a statutory rape law as a gender-based classification despite no express
reference to 'men' or 'males' where only men can "accomplish sexual intercourse...
with a female"); accord Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that a school board regulation requiring pregnant
school teachers to take unpaid maternity leave could be invalidated more soundly on

1993]

THE ROAD NOT TAKEN

59

a pregnancy-related case when the government's policy burdens
women rather than simply fails to benefit them. Thus, in Nashville
Gas Company v. Satty,2 " the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
plaintiffs established a disparate impact, because the employment
policy substantially burdened women's reproductive freedom. 5
Once a gender-based classification is identified, it will be
deemed unconstitutional unless its proponents "carry the burden of
showing an 'exceedingly persuasivejustification."'" In assessing the
justifications offered for gender-based measures, the Court undertakes
a "searching analysis"247 of whether the restriction is, in fact,
"substantially related to the statutory objective.""24 This "searching
analysis" is required because gender-based measures are often not the
product of reasoned analysis; rather, measures that single out one
gender for special disadvantages often reflect the mechanical
application of archaic sexual stereotypes. 4 9

equal protection grounds); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (analogizing
LaFleur to the cases establishing that gender-based classifications receive heightened
scrutiny).
434 U.S. 136 (1977).
'5 A gender-based impact is established when the government "has not merely
refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has
imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer." Satty, 434 U.S. at
142. Contra Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 485 (1974) (holding that distinctions
based on pregnancy which determined the grant of disability payments were not genderbased). Although Satty involved an alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, the Court used the same analysis to determine whether a gender-based impact had
been established as it would have in a constitutional case. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 13844. Additionally, Salty was decided before Congress amended Title VII expressly to
make clear that regulations involving pregnancy were to be considered gender-based.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991)). Therefore the Saty Court decided, without the benefit
of statutory interpretation, that the regulation constituted gender-based discrimination by
analogizing Title VII analysis to equal protection analysis. See 434 U.S. at 142. The
Supreme Court subsequently has conceded that, for statutory purposes, "discrimination
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex."
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
246 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (quoting Kirchberg
v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
247Id. at 728.
248 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).

' Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724-26 nn. 10-11.
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Especially in the context of gender-based restrictions, courts
must be wary that government officials not ascribe worthy objectives
to legislation that actually reflects archaic and stereotypical
conceptions of women. 2 This danger is particularly acute in the
case of abortion restrictions. Such measures, shrewdly characterized
as advancing the cause of "informed consent," may actually reflect
a desire to confine women to a single role-that of child-bearers. 51
Such a motivation renders the legislation unconstitutional. 5 2 Caseytype provisions, by placing substantial burdens in the paths of women
seeking abortion, are clearly motivated by such stereotypical and
paternalistic conceptions.
ii. Deprivation of a FundamentalRight
The heightened scrutiny applicable to gender-based
classifications escalates to the highest level where, as here, legislation
that discriminates on the basis of gender also intrudes on bodily
Id. at 725.
251 This

historical preoccupation with women as child-bearers is particularly evident

in Ohio. Indeed, the legislative history of an 1867 statute criminalizing abortion strongly
supports this assertion:
The report characterized abortion as a source of grave physical and
moral danger to women, because abortion was a violation of nature's
laws and '[a]ny interference with nature's laws results in evils
innumerable.' It deplored the ignorance which led 'our otherwise
amiable sisters to the commission of this crime,' and held women
who resisted motherhood in the utmost contempt, condemning those
who yielded to '[tlhe demands of society and fashionable life' and
succumbed to 'the desire of freedom from care and home duties and
responsibilities.' The report concluded with a strong warning to the
married women of Ohio . . . charg[ing] that wives who 'avoid[ed]
the duties and responsibilities of married life' were 'living in a state
of legalized prostitution,' thereby endangering the manifest destiny
of the race.
Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspectiveon Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 316-17 (1992) (quoting 1867
Ohio Senate J. App. 233, 233-35).
2 See Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 726 n.l1.
(stressing the need to
invalidate legislation whose gender-based classification "was based upon traditional
assumptions that 'the female [is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the
family"') (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)).
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integrity, procreation, health, and family. 3 Though the U.S.
Supreme Court may no longer regard abortion as a fundamental
right,' it is nevertheless possible to obtain strict scrutiny by
persuading a state court to hold, as a matter of state constitutional
law, that freedom of choice is a fundamental guarantee. In the
abortion funding cases discussed above, 5 the courts in New York, 6
New Jersey," California,"5 and Connecticut 9 each held that the
freedom to choose abortion is a fundamental right under the state
constitution. Since those holdings rest on independent state grounds,
they are insulated from the U.S. Supreme Court's apparent retreat.
Principles of federalism also ensure that state courts confronted with
this issue in the future will not be constrained to follow the High
Court's lead. 2"
3. Free Speech
"Informed consent" provisions of the sort upheld in Casey
violate free speech guarantees because, through the mandatory
delivery of state-printed materials, the government is disseminating
propaganda-namely, an anti-abortion message-to a captive
audience, and is forcing taxpayers and abortion clinics to fund that

" See, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause to a compulsory sterilization law); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause to a marriage restriction that discriminated against persons with outstanding childsupport obligations). Accord Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846 (Blackmun, J. concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("In short, restrictive
abortion laws force women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than those
this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other
contexts.").
2s4 See supra note 211; Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2821.
25 See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
2m Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595
N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1993).
17 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982).
5 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 790 (Cal. 1981).
, Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. 1986).
o City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
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message. By compelling medical providers to communicate the
state's ideology, by requiring women seeking abortions to receive
materials setting forth the state's view on abortion, or by requiring
the physician to communicate with his or her patient in order to
explain or ameliorate the effects of state-mandated information, such
provisions offend basic principles of free speech.261
Though the U.S. Supreme Court did not expressly rely on the
First Amendment when it struck down similar regulations in the
1980s, it employed an analysis that implicated free speech values.263
Those rulings-later repudiated in Casey264-may be replicated by
means of state free speech guarantees.

a. Exploiting Textual Differences Between State Free Speech
Guaranteesand the Federal FirstAmendment
In pursuing such a theory, it will be advantageous to show
that the state free speech clause is broader than the Federal First
Amendment. To this end, it would be wise to exploit textual
differences between the state and federal provisions. In many states,
the free speech guarantee is phrased very differently than the First
Amendment. The federal speech clause, like every other provision
in the Bill of Rights, is phrased negatively-as a restraint on
governmental power: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... ,,5
State free speech provisions may be grouped into three
categories: those that emulate the exclusively negative language of

21

See generally Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of

Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv.
(holding a public right to know does not justify a constitutional right
to engage in extensive communications activities).
26 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
(liberty/privacy theory); Thornburgh v. American College of
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1986) (liberty/privacy theory).
26 See infra notes 295-309 and accompanying text.
264 Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
' U.S. CONST. amend. I.

863, 869 (1979)
for governments
416, 445 (1983)
Obstetricians &
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the Federal First Amendment, 2" those that confer speech rights in
sweeping affirmative language,267 and those that combine affirmative
and negative clauses.268
These affirmative expressions, whether or not coupled with
a negative clause, provide a striking contrast to the federal charter.
Pennsylvania's provision is a good example: "The free
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, 'and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print
on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that right. "2 69 The
broad scope of this clause, and the fact that it contains virtually no
limiting language, suggest that it may be more protective of speech
than the Federal First Amendment.
b. Textual Analysis Under the Ohio Constitution
Ohio's speech guarantee contains both affirmative and
negative language: "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and

2m 12 states, along with the District of Columbia, feature negative language of the
sort employed in the First Amendment: D. C. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 9; KY. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 10; MASS. CONST. part I, art. 16; N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 8; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 21; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
1 There are 18 states with speech clauses phrased solely in affirmative language:
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. I, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 4; DEL. CoNST. art. I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art.

I, § 4; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 11; M[NN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. III, §
13; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.H. CONST. part I, art. 22; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 5; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 20.
20 states feature speech provisions that combine affirmative and negative clauses:
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 7; ME. CONST. art.
I, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 5; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. 1I, § 7;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, part 6; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17; N.Y.

CONST. art. I, § 8; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; TEx. CONST.

art. 1, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 13; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; Wis. CONST. art. I, §
3.
2 PA. CONST. art. I, § 7. Virtually identical language may be found in ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 6 and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech, or of the press. , 27 0 Free speech provisions of this
sort may represent the best opportunity for securing broader
protection than that afforded by the Federal First Amendment. By
combining negative, federal-style restraints with an affirmative grant
of rights, such provisions may be seen as going beyond the First
Amendment's scope.
A close textual analysis of Ohio's provision supports this
argument. Ohio's free speech guarantee contains two distinct clauses
separated by a semicolon; only the second clause-"no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the
press "-corresponds to the federal provision. Had the Ohio drafters
intended to offer no greater protection for speech and press than that
provided by the First Amendment, they would have employed only
the second clause.
But Article I, § 11 contains other language as well. It says
at its very beginning (and therefore, presumably, of most importance
to its drafters): "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the
right. " 271' The second clause cannot be deemed redundant of the first
clause-such a construction would conflict with long-standing
principles of interpretation governing the Ohio Constitution: "In the
construction of a section of the [Ohio] constitution, the whole section
should be construed together, and effect given to every part and
272
sentence."
Thus, the scope of Ohio's free speech provision cannot be
confined to the language in its second clause-and since that second
clause is identical to the federal free speech guarantee, Ohio's
provision is necessarily broader than its federal counterpart. Indeed,
state courts interpreting free speech provisions similar to Ohio's have
concluded that their constitutions confer more sweeping protection

270 OHIo CONST.
271

art. I, § 11.

Id.

'a Froelich v. Cleveland, 124 N.E. 212, 216 (Ohio 1919) (emphasis added).
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c. Decisions ConstruingState Free Speech Provisions More
Broadly Than the Federal FirstAmendment
Whether state speech clauses exceed the First Amendment's
scope is a question addressed in a line of cases involving speech
activities in privately-owned shopping malls. In a 1972 shopping
mall case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment
serves only to restrain governmental restrictions on speech.2 74 This
issue has since been litigated under state constitutions, with results
that are instructive for our purposes.
The question addressed in these cases is whether the state
constitution is broad enough to govern private actors who suppress
speech. Such an issue necessarily requires the court to decide
whether the state speech clause is broader than the First Amendment.
A number of .these decisions have construed speech guarantees that,
like Ohio's, 271 feature both negative and affirmative language. The
results, not surprisingly, are mixed.

California,27 6 New Jersey,27 7

Colorado27

and, most recently,
have deemed their speech clauses
sufficiently broad to confer a limited right of access to private

I See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo. 1991) (holding that,
unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Colorado Constitution protects an individual's right to
distribute political pamphlets within the public spaces of a privately-owned mall); Robins
v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979) (holding that soliciting
signatures at a shopping center is an activity protected by the California Constitution);
State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626 (N.J. 1980) (holding that the New Jersey
Constitution afforded greater protection to rights of expression than the U.S.
Constitution).
4 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
2S The Ohio Supreme Court recently rejected the notion that the state constitution's
free speech guarantee affords any right of access to the common areas of privatelyowned malls for speech activites. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio
1994).
276 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
27 State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (N.J. 1980) (campus of private
university), af'd, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
27 Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61 (Colo. 1991) (shopping mall).
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property

for speech

demurred, 28°-though,

activity.279

Seven

other

states have

in the process, one acknowledged that the state

I7Cf. Right to Life Advocates v.

Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564, 567-68

(Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (although the court did not
allow expressive activity in this case, the court adopted the New Jersey test established
in Schmid, 423 A.2d at 632-22, and stated that an abortion clinic is different than a
shopping mal and implied that it would allow free speech in a shopping mal).
280 The Michigan Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to free
speech in a privately owned shopping mal. Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378
N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985). The Woodland court cited debates of the Michigan
Constitutional Convention in which the delegates debated and rejected a provision that
would have broadened the free speech clause. Id. at 345-46. Thus the delegates
expressly intended that Michigan's free speech guarantee would extend only to state
action. Id. New York's highest court has held that its constitution affords no protection
for someone who wants to distribute leaflets in a private shopping mal. SHAD Alliance
v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1218 (N.Y. 1985). Of special significance to
the court was the fact that New York's constitution was adopted at a relatively early date
(1822); this distinguished it from the New Jersey provision construed in Schmid, which
was drafted in 1844. Id. at 1214-15. Historical records showed, moreover, that the
New York provision was based on the Federal Bill of Rights. Id. at 1213. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the positive-negative language in the state free
speech clause is not ambiguous, and that it serves to restrain only the government.
Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 836-37 (Wis. 1987). The court traced the Wisconsin
provision to those of New York and Connecticut, which have been interpreted by their
courts as affording no speech rights in shopping malls. Id. at 842. The court found it
significant, moreover, that Wisconsin does not have an initiative provision. Id. at 84344. Finally, the court observed that the speech activity at issue occurred in Madison
(site of the state capitol and the University of Wisconsin) thus, the court reasoned, there
were plenty of traditional public forums available to the petitioner. Id. at 844. While
conceding that a state constitution may afford more expansive protections than the U.S.
Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the history of its constitution
required the conclusion that its bill of rights applies only to state action. Western Pa.
Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331,
1334-35 (Pa. 1986). The state supreme courts in Georgia and Iowa found no protection
in their constitutions for speech in privately owned shopping mals. Neither court,
however, performed an extensive analysis of its constitutional text or heritage. The
Georgia court merely echoed the reasoning in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972) (construing the Federal Constitution). Citizens for Ethical Govt., Inc. v. Gwinnett
Place Ass'n, 392 S.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ga. 1990). The Iowa court offered a very limited
analysis, holding simply that the state constitution does not allow free speech on private
property. State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 539-40 (Iowa 1991). Such claims were
most recently rejected in Ohio, where the state supreme court, ignoring the textual
differences between the state free speech clause and the Federal First Amendment,
treated the case essentially as a dispute over property rights, devoid of any larger free
speech implications. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 60-62 (Ohio
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speech guarantee might be broader than the First Amendment. 28'
the state speech
Mixed results have likewise occurred in cases where
282
language.
affirmative
in
solely
phrased
clause is
The California, New Jersey, and Colorado decisions provide
an encouraging sign that state supreme courts may be willing to view
state speech guarantees as substantially broader than the First
Amendment. The analysis performed in these cases provides useful
instruction to those who would invoke a state speech clause in
challenging Casey-type "informed consent" provisions.
The New Jersey Supreme Court performed both a textual and
a historical analysis. It began with a close comparison between its
speech clause and the Federal First Amendment. "A basis for finding
exceptional vitality in the New Jersey Constitution with respect to
individual rights of speech and assembly is found in part in the

1994).
2 ' Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Pa. 1986).
2s2 Of the states with free speech clauses phrased only in affirmative language, four
have ruled on this issue. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that there
is a right to collect signatures in a shopping mall for election petitions. Batchelder v.
Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983). Though the court relied on the
Massachusetts free election provision, it stressed that the provision is written as a
positive right. Id. at 593. Therefore, it is not directed solely at state action. Id. The
court also noted that malls function "in many parts of th[e] State much as the
'downtown' area of a municipality did in earlier years." Id. at 595. This quasi-public
aspect of malls prompted the court to recognize them as latter-day public forums. Id.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the fundamental nature of its constitution
is to protect individuals from the abuse of state power. Southcenter Joint Venture v.
National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1989). Thus, it held that
there is no right to free speech in a private mall. Id. at 1292. The Connecticut Supreme
Court likewise held that its constitution provides no right to free speech in a shopping
mail. Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc., 469 A.2d 120 (Conn. 1984). The Court relied,
however, on the fact that its constitution was adopted in 1818 (near the time of New
York's), and that according to contemporaneous historical accounts, it was the popular
sentiment then that bills of rights should protect against infringement of liberties by the
government; and, finally, that there is nothing in Connecticut's history to suggest that
this provision was intended to reach private suppression of speech. Id. at 1207-08
(emphasis added). An Arizona appeals court held that while the state constitution may
provide more protection than its federal counterpart, it does not provide the right to free
speech in a private mall. Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Committee, 767 P.2d
719, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing the history of its free speech provision, and
finding nothing to indicate that it was intended to restrain private conduct).
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language employed. Our Constitution affirmatively recognizes these
freedoms ....""' The court construed this affirmative language as
conferring a direct grant of speech rights to the people. 2"
Accordingly, New Jersey's speech clause is "more sweeping in scope
than the language of the First Amendment,""' because the affirmative
clause performs a different function than the negative, federal-style
clause with which it is combined: "[O]ur State Constitution not only
affirmatively guarantees to individuals the rights of speech and
assembly, but also expressly prohibits government itself, in a manner
analogous to the federal First and Fourteenth Amendments, from
unlawfully restraining or abridging 'the liberty of speech."' 286 Thus,
by combining an affirmative grant of speech rights with negative
restraints on governmental power, New Jersey's speech clause is
broader than the First Amendment-broad enough to reach private
suppression of speech.28 7
The New Jersey court followed its textual analysis with a
brief examination of local history and tradition: "Since it is our State
Constitution which we are here expounding, it is also fitting that we
look to our own strong traditions which prize the exercise of
individual rights and stress the societal obligations that are
concomitant to a public enjoyment of private property." 28 Based on
its textual and historical analysis, the court recognized a limited right
of access to private property for speech activities, and announced a
three-part balancing test for determining when such access must be
'3State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626 (N.J. 1980) (emphasis added).
21Id. at 627 ("Hence, the explicit affirmation of these fundamental rights in our
Constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a restriction upon
them.") (emphasis added).
255 Id.

at 626.

Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628.

mhe rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the State
Constitution are protectable not only against governmental or public
bodies, but under some circumstances against private persons as
well. .

.

. The State Constitution in this fashion serves to thwart

inhibitory actions which unreasonably frustrate, infringe, or obstruct
the expressional and associational rights of individuals exercised
under [our speech and assembly provisions]. ...
Id.
288

Id. at 629-30.
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The Supreme Courts of California 2' and Colorado 291 likewise
performed a textual analysis, each holding that affirmative language
in the state constitution's speech guarantee creates a broader sweep
than the First Amendment. 29 The Colorado Supreme Court also
looked to history, noting that its free speech guarantee had long been
construed more broadly than the First Amendment, 293 and that the
Colorado courts had developed a "tolerance standard" in deciding
speech cases that imposed "more stringent scrutiny" than federal
jurisprudence.294
These cases demonstrate the vitality of free speech protection
The court set forth its new standard as follows:
Accordingly, we now hold that under the State Constitution, the test
to be applied to ascertain the parameters of the rights of speech and
assembly upon privately-owned property and the extent to which
such property reasonably can be restricted to accommodate these
rights involves several elements. This standard must take into
account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private
property, generally, its "normal" use, (2) the extent and nature of the
public's invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the
expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to
both the private and public use of the property. This is a multifaceted test which must be applied to ascertain whether in a given
case owners of private property may be required to permit, subject
to suitable restrictions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of the
constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly.
Id. at 630.
o Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346, (Cal. 1979) (holding that
California's speech clause is "'more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment'.
.") (quoting Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 120 (Cal. 1975)).
z' Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991) (identifying the
"affirmative declaration" contained in the second clause of Colorado's speech guarantee
as "necessarily enhanc[ing] the already preferred position of speech under the [Federal]
First Amendment. . ."); The court held that "the second clause of [Colorado's speech
provision] is an affirmative acknowledgement of the liberty of speech, and therefore of
greaterscope than that guaranteed by the First Amendment .
Id. at 59 (emphasis
added).
I See Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 347 n.5 (granting a limited right of access to
shopping malls, expanding the public forum doctrine under their state constitution and
recognizing that the common areas of modern malls are latter-day public forums); see
also Bock, 819 P.2d at 62.
2" Bock, 819 P.2d at 59-60.
29 Id. at 60.
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under state constitutions. The expansive interpretation of state speech
guarantees that developed in this line of cases may be readily applied
in other contexts, including the government-compelled speech
imposed under Casey-type "informed consent" provisions.

d. State ConstitutionalGuaranteesof Free Speech Can Replicate
Now Repudiated U.S. Supreme Court Decisions That Struck
Down Government Efforts to Use "Informed Consent"
Regulations to Compel Anti-abortion Speech
Governmental efforts to compel anti-abortion speech under the
guise of "informed consent" regulations may be challenged under
state free speech provisions. In pursuing such a challenge, the
rudiments of a theory may be gleaned from two cases, City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health295 and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists,296 in which the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down "informed consent" provisions that
required doctors to convey various anti-abortion messages to their
patients." 7 Though the Court did not expressly rely on the First
Amendment in arriving at these rulings,29 it employed an analysis
that implicated free speech values. 299 These decisions-later
repudiated in Casey300-may be replicated by means of state free
speech guarantees.
In both Akron and Thornburgh, the Court raised special
concerns about the government forcing doctors to communicate an

295462 U.S. 416 (1983).
29
"7

476 U.S. 747 (1986).
Akron, 462 U.S. at 445; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764.

2w In both cases, the Court was presented with the usual liberty/privacy theory.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 443-45; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758-59.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 445; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762-63. Prior to Akron and
Thornburgh, lower federal courts had employed a similar free speech analysis in striking
down "right to know" provisions governing abortion. See Planned Parenthood League
v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1021-22 (1st Cir. 1981); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772,
784 (7th Cir. 1980); Women's Medical Ctr. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1153-54
(D.R.I. 1982).
0 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (overruling Akron and Thornburgh). The Court expressly
rejected a First Amendment theory advanced by petitioners. Id. at 2824.
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anti-abortion message. The Akron Court observed that "much of the
information is designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather
to persuade her to withhold it altogether."3 1 By "intru[ding] upon
the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician," 3" the government
was "placing the physician in
straitjacket. '"303

. .

.an 'undesired and uncomfortable

This concern with government-compelled speech was voiced
even more emphatically in Thornburgh. Referring to a requirement
that doctors give their patients state-printed brochures containing
pictures of fetal development, the Court wrote: "The printed
materials ...

seem to us to be nothing less than an outright attempt

to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into
the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and
her physician. "I' The Court recognized that the government was
effectively forcing doctors to communicate-and, inevitably, to
validate-its anti-abortion message: "Forcing the physician . . . to
present the materials . . . to the woman makes him or her in effect

an agent of the State in treating the woman and places his or her
imprimatur upon

..

the materials ... "I"

This analysis provides the kernel of a free speech theory that,
though unavailable under the First Amendment, 0 6 might well be
advanced under state constitutions. The essence of this theory is
government-compelled speech: forcing individuals to convey the
government's anti-abortion ideology, whether or not they agree with
it.30 7 As we have seen,308 affirmative language in state free speech
guarantees may be construed as a positive grant of speech rights.

3o1462 U.S. at 444.
SId. at 445.
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)).
30'476 U.S. at 762.

Id. at 763.
3 Casey expressly rejected a First Amendment claim directed at "informed consent"
requirements virtually identical to those struck down in Thornburgh. 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
1 Cf.Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the State of New
Hampshire could not require plaintiffs, who were followers of the Jehovah's Witnesses
faith, to display the state motto-"Live Free or Die"-on their license plates). The
government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, "require an individual to
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message." Id. at 713.
' See supra notes 274-87 and accompanying text.
3
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State provisions that feature such affirmative phrasing do not merely
restrain governmental suppression of speech; they also "impose upon
the.. . government an affirmative obligation to protect fundamental
individual rights." 3 Thus, the freedom of speech conveyed by such
a provision guarantees not only protection from the government, but
protection by the government. This freedom of speech necessarily
entails the freedom not to be made the unwilling mouthpiece of the
state.
E. Employing State ConstitutionalProvisions with No Federal
Counterpart-the "Freedom of Conscience" Guarantee
Many state constitutions contain "freedom of conscience"
guarantees."' Such provisions may represent an invaluable tool in
challenging Casey-type regulations. By compelling medical providers
to convey to their patients a state-mandated message disapproving of
abortion; by establishing a state orthodoxy regarding abortion, and,
through the imposition of procedural obstacles, punishing women who
seek abortion; or, by invading the doctor-patient dialogue with a
governmental message disapproving of abortion, Casey-type
restrictions arguably violate the right to freedom of conscience."'

309State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 627 (N.J. 1980) (emphasis added).
310

ARIz. CONST. art. II,

§ 12; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4;

COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 3; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; KAN. CONST.
BILL OF RIGHTS, § 7; KY. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, §§ 1, 5; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3;
MASS. CONST. part I, art. II; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16;

Mo. CONST. art. I, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.H.
CONST. part I, art. 4, 5; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 7; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3;

S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 6; UTAH
CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 4; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 3; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH.

CONST. art. I, § 11; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18; and Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 18.
"' See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2822-25 (upholding "informed consent" provision and 24hour waiting period to review anti-abortion literature).
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1. Textual Analysis
Ohio's "freedom of conscience" guarantee has no identical
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution, and is directly applicable to the
issue of reproductive freedom. The provision is set forth in the midst
of other guarantees protecting religious and moral independence.
Article I, § 7 provides in pertinent part:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own conscience. No person shall be compelled
to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or
maintain any form of worship, against his consent;
and no preference shall be given, by law, to any
religious society; nor shall any interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted.... 312
The Federal Constitution has no identical counterpart; its only
analogous provisions are the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
*3t3 These federal provisions are expressly tied to "religion." The
Ohio Constitution, however, extends beyond the traditional sphere of
religion to embrace the more sweeping concept of "conscience."
Freedom of conscience necessarily includes moral and philosophical
views that lay far beyond the confines of established religion.3 t4
A textual comparison reveals, therefore, that Ohio's freedom
of conscience provision exceeds the scope of the federal religion
clauses. This reading is consistent with Ohio's long-standing
tradition of constitutional interpretation, which requires that effect be
given to every part and sentence of a constitutional provision. 5

art. I, § 7 (1851) (emphasis added).
amend. 1 (1791).
314 "Conscience is that moral sense in man which dictates to him right and wrong."
312 OHIo CONST.
313 U.S. CONST.

Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948). In Casey, Justice Stevens specifically
described a woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion as a matter of
"conscience." 112 S. Ct. at 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376 (1919) (emphasis added).
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Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court, construing a right of
conscience provision virtually identical to Ohio's,' 6 has ruled that the
Minnesota provision "is broader and more emphatic than the religion
clauses of the [Federal Constitution]. "317 More recently, a Minnesota
appeals court held that this conscience clause is broad enough to
protect individual views on abortion.3"'
2. Whether Construed Broadly or Narrowly, Ohio's Freedom of
Conscience Provision Reaches-and Invalidates-Provisionsof
the Sort Upheld in Casey
a. Broad Construction
Construed broadly, Ohio's freedom of conscience provision
easily reaches, and invalidates, Casey. If it means anything, the right
of conscience must prevent the government from interfering in
decisions that involve deeply held moral and philosophical views. Its
application is all the more critical when the decision will have a
profound impact on the direction of a person's life. For women, the
prospect of an abortion poses precisely such a decision. By invading
the doctor-patient dialogue with a governmental message disapproving
of abortion, such regulations violate the right to freedom of
conscience guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution.

316 See Minn. Const. art. 1, § 16 ("The right of every man to worship God according

to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; ... nor shall any control
of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.").
"' State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (holding that a state
statute requiring Amish citizens to display a slow-moving-vehicle emblem on their horsedrawn carriages violated the state's freedom-of-conscience guarantee). Accord State ex
reL Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990) (right of conscience precludes
imposing civil penalties upon landlord who refused, on moral grounds, to rent apartment
to unmarried couple).
318Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 516 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding that the
owner of a delicatessen could not be prosecuted under a public accommodations
ordinance for refusing, on grounds of moral conscience, to deliver food to an abortion
clinic). Since this refusal to set foot inside the clinic was based upon his profound
opposition to the services performed there, the owner's actions, were a direct expression
of his right of conscience, and therefore could not be punished consistent with the state
constitution. Id.
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b. Narrow Construction
Even if construed narrowly-confined, for example, to
governmental interference with religious beliefs3 t9-Ohio's conscience
provision invalidates a statute like that addressed in Casey. The issue
of abortion is necessarily intertwined with religious and moral
perspectives. 20 Indeed, it is undeniable that "the intensely divisive
character of much of the national debate over the abortion issue
reflects the deeply held religious convictions of many participants in
the debate." 32
"' Those who oppose freedom of choice consistently
base their position on the religious principle that life begins at
conception. 22 But other religions, notably Judaism, teach that life
does not begin until live birth, and give precedence "to the well-being
of the woman and her existing family. ,323 Thus, a woman's freedom
of conscience is ultimately the freedom to act in accordance with her
own religious and moral beliefs. And a state-mandated message
disapproving of abortion, coupled with governmental efforts to
burden or penalize women who seek abortion, is nothing less than an
effort by the government to force women to adhere to a particular
religious viewpoint-in direct violation of Ohio's freedom of
311 Confining Ohio's conscience provision solely to "religious" beliefs will not
necessarily narrow its application in any significant way. See Robert L. Rabin, When
is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise,
51 CORNELL L.Q. 231, 232-33 (1966). Religious freedom cases often interpret the
concept of religion broadly to include humanistic inquiries-"an exploration of the nature
of man, his diverse activities and interests, his quest for unity with something more than
merely himself." Id. at 245.
3 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 565-72
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321 Id. at 571.
322 Id. at 566 n.9.
3. Janice C. Biskin, The Hyde Amendment: An Infringement Upon the Free Exercise

Clause?, 33 RuTGERS L. REV. 1054, 1064 n.69 (1981). See, McRae v. Califano, 491
F.Supp. 630, 692-702 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (containing a comprehensive overview of the
testimony of various theologians regarding religious doctrine pertaining to the abortion
decision). The conservative and reformed teachings of Jewish Law emphasize the
"primacy of the duty to protect existing life and health, coupled with a belief that life
does not begin until live birth. . . . [A]bortion is mandated if there is a danger to the
mother's health. Biskin, supra, at 1064 n.69. In McRae, one rabbi testified: "The
decision to have an abortion is as much a part of the exercise of the Jewish Religion as
the observance of ritual." Id.
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conscience guarantee.324

V. Conclusion
State constitutions represent the last, best hope for restoring
the level of reproductive autonomy that formerly existed under the
Federal Constitution.32
Judicial reaction to state constitutional
theories will vary from state to state. In some jurisdictions, the status
quo will weigh heavily against any florescence of state constitutional
jurisprudence. But necessity is the mother of invention and, in the
wake of Casey, state constitutions represent the most promising tool
at hand.
More important, even the most skeptical jurist must admit that
principles of federalism preclude any notion that state constitutions
lack independent force. Each charter has its own unique text and its
own unique history; this much cannot be ignored. Nor can the
burgeoning development of state constitutions in many jurisdictions
be ignored.32 Finally, some judges may be pleasantly surprised to
learn that constitutional interpretation is not the sole province of the
U.S. Supreme Court-that, for them, it need not be a spectator sport.
More precisely, state court judges need to be reminded that they have
the power and the duty to perform an independent interpretation of
their state charters.

324 But see Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992) (rejecting state

equal protection, freedom-of-religion, and establishment-of-religion claims in a challenge
to abortion access restrictions).
' Though many put their faith in the Federal Freedom of Choice Act, S.25, d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), which is currently wending its way through Congress, serious
questions persist as to whether the federal legislature has the power under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, to enact such a law. The only conceivable source of this
power is the Federal Commerce Clause and, despite its nearly boundless elasticity,
reliance on this clause may not withstand judicial scrutiny. See generally Ira C. Lupu,
Statutes Revolving In Constitutional Law Orbits, VA. L. REv. 1, 37 (1993) (discussing
the validity of substantive statutory schemes, such as the Freedom of Choice Act, that
attempt to legislate constitutional norms). See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112
S.Ct. 2408 (1992) (striking down portions of a federal statute that effectively coerced,
rather than encouraged, state legislatures to adopt a particular regulatory scheme
concerning low-level radioactive waste).
326 See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
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These factors-federalism, the unique text and history of state
constitutions, the burgeoning renaissance in many states, and the
historic role of state courts in construing their own constitutions-may
inspire a willingness, even among the most doubtful jurists, to take
a second look at their own state charters.
Just as the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights prompted this
renaissance in the first place,3 27 so may the erosion of reproductive
rights trigger an upsurge in state constitutional claims. It is my hope
that this article will provide a road map for those who would invoke
their state charters in the fight for reproductive freedom.

327 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.

